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LEGAL IGNORANCE AND INFORMATION-FORCING RULES
J.H. VERKERKE*
ABSTRACT
People are often ignorant about the legal rules that govern the
most common transactions in their lives. This Article analyzes one
common regulatory response to our widespread legal ignorance. A
surprisingly broad range of legal rules have the ostensible purpose
of inducing sophisticated parties to draft express contract language
that will inform their contractual partners about the legal rules
governing a particular transaction. However, this “legal-information-
forcing” objective often remains unrealized because people routinely
sign contracts without reading and understanding their terms. In
theory, courts could design information-forcing rules that would be
truly informative. But recognizing the potential futility of attempts
to inform many contracting parties about complex legal rules, this
Article also develops and critiques several alternative justifications
for “clause-forcing” rules that encourage sophisticated parties to draft
express contract terms. Such terms could facilitate the activities of
avid comparison shoppers, reviewers, and consumer advocates. Com-
prehensive written terms also may promote ex post legal clarity and
thereby reduce the costs of resolving disputes. Finally, exculpatory
clauses allow parties to contract out of the comparatively expensive
legal system of dispute resolution in favor of a regime governed by
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informal social norms. On this account, clause-forcing rules
encourage sophisticated drafting parties to signal their preference for
a norm-governed relationship, and lawmakers then demarcate the
boundary between law and norms by deciding whether to enforce ex-
culpatory clauses. The normative desirability of these clause-forcing
rules is unclear, but my exploration of these alternative justifications
shows the conceptual poverty of accounts that presume express
contract terms inform the majority of unsophisticated parties.
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INTRODUCTION
People are often ignorant about the legal rules that govern the
most common transactions in their lives.1 Whether purchasing
products and services, leasing real estate, obtaining insurance,
borrowing money, or finding employment, many laypeople have a
surprisingly poor grasp of basic legal principles.2 Of course, this
ignorance usually causes no harm. We buy what we need and work
until retirement without becoming embroiled in legal disputes. But
sometimes people involved in conflicts over defective products,
unpaid insurance claims, loan defaults, or employment terminations
must assert legal rights or defenses, and some of them ultimately
resort to litigation. In circumstances like these, having too little
legal knowledge can be dangerous. Legal ignorance potentially
distorts important economic decisions. Without a clear understand-
ing of their legal rights and responsibilities, some consumers will
mistakenly agree to exculpatory contract terms. Borrowers will
accept harsh credit terms. And employees will rely on illusory
promises of job security.
Lawmakers have sometimes attempted to combat informational
problems such as these by enacting rules that directly mandate
disclosure. The federal Truth in Lending Act, for example, requires
lenders to disclose interest rates and fees in a statutorily prescribed
way.3 Whenever an employer uses an outside firm to check a job
applicant’s background, it must disclose that fact and obtain consent
from the applicant under provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting
1. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 144-45 (1991) (reviewing evidence of legal ignorance in numerous studies).
2. See, e.g., Martha William & Jay Hall, Knowledge of the Law in Texas: Socioeconomic
and Ethnic Differences, 7 L. & SOC’Y REV. 99, 113 (1972) (reporting interview respondents did,
at best, slightly better than chance when answering yes-or-no questions about Texas civil
law); Note, Legal Knowledge of Michigan Citizens, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1468 (1973)
(reporting substantial ignorance of Michigan law, including consumer law).
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2012). For controversy concerning damages under the Act, see
Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 53 (2004). For commentary critical of
mandatory disclosure duties in general and Truth in Lending Act requirements in particular,
see OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE
FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014); and Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The
Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 679-729 (2011).
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Act.4 And regulations issued by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission compel issuers to publish exhaustive prospectuses when
they offer stock for sale.5 A voluminous scholarly literature debates
whether the informational value of such mandated disclosures
exceeds their cost.6 My focus here, however, is not on these explicit
disclosure regulations.
Instead, this Article analyzes a different regulatory response to
our widespread legal ignorance. It explores how the law encourages
sophisticated parties to provide legal information to the compara-
tively poorly informed individuals with whom they do business.
Many rules in surprisingly diverse fields of law impose unfavorable
default terms on sellers, employers, insurers, and other compara-
tively sophisticated parties, but allow those parties to opt out of
these default terms by drafting contract terms that meet certain
standards for clarity. Thus, for example, a clear statement disclaim-
ing the implied warranty of merchantability negates that default
provision of the Uniform Commercial Code.7 Likewise, an employer
can defeat most implied contract claims of unjust discharge by
requiring new employees to sign an express confirmation of at-will
status.8
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a (2012). 
5. See 12 C.F.R. § 16.3 (2014).
6. See, e.g., BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at 6-7; Ben-Shahar & Schneider,
supra note 3, at 651; Henry T.C. Hu, Illiteracy and Intervention: Wholesale Derivatives, Retail
Mutual Funds, and the Matter of Asset Class, 84 GEO. L.J. 2319, 2376-77 (1996) (arguing that
despite investors’ lack of reliance on disclosures, “investor education and more comprehensible
forms of mandated disclosure are worthwhile”); Lewis Mandell, Consumer Perception of
Incurred Interest Rates: An Empirical Test of the Efficacy of the Truth-in-Lending Law, 26 J.
FIN. 1143, 1153 (1971); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis
of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 668-71
(1979); William C. Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer
Transactions, 1973 WIS. L. REV. 400, 403-04; Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy
Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 201-02 (2008).
7. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (2012) (imposing implied warranty of merchantability as a default
term “if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind”); id. § 2-315 (“Where the
seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the
goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller’s skill or judgment to select or
furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an implied
warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.”); id. § 2-316(3)(a) (“[A]ll implied
warranties are excluded by expressions like ‘as is’, ‘with all faults’ or other language which
in common understanding calls the buyer’s attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes
plain that there is no implied warranty.”). 
8. See, e.g., Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453, 462 (6th Cir. 1986) (enforcing
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I argue here that we can best understand these and other rules
as particular instances of an approach that contract theorists have
dubbed “information-forcing” or “penalty defaults.”9 Originating in
modern scholarly efforts to justify the famous rule of Hadley v.
Baxendale, the information-forcing framework uses an unfavorable
default to redress problems of asymmetric information between the
parties to a contract.10 Lawmakers select a default rule that disad-
vantages the better informed party. In order to escape the unfavor-
able default, the informed party must disclose information to her
less well-informed contractual partner. The canonical information-
forcing default in Hadley thus limits a party’s consequential
damages for breach unless she discloses any special circumstances
that may cause unusual losses.11
This concept extends quite naturally from information about
potential consequential losses from breach to situations in which the
parties have an asymmetric understanding of the legal rules govern-
ing their relationship. Unfavorable default rules encourage legally
sophisticated parties to contract expressly for their preferred terms.
At least in theory, these express contract terms could inform unso-
phisticated parties about the law. Many courts and legislators have
formulated default rules with legal-information-forcing concerns
an employee handbook provision that confirmed employees’ at-will status and restricted auth-
ority to modify the contractual terms of employment). See generally J.H. Verkerke, The Story
of Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche: Finding a Way to Enforce Employee Handbook Promises,
in EMPLOYMENT LAW STORIES 23, 64 (Samuel Estreicher & Gillian Lester eds., 2007).
9. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (coining the term "penalty default" to refer
to contract rules establishing a default that one or both parties will find unappealing in order
to create an incentive to disclose information or to bargain); John H. Barton, The Economic
Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 295-96 (1972) (arguing for the
first time that the Hadley rule of foreseeability promotes efficiency by creating an incentive
to disclose information about expected damages); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott,
Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1299-1300
(1980) (identifying how the default rule excluding unforeseeable consequential damages could
promote efficiency by encouraging parties to exchange information about the expected losses
from breach).
10. 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151; 9 Ex. 341, 355 (1854).
11. See id. at 151 (limiting damages to those that “may fairly and reasonably be
considered either arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, ... or such as
may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time
they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it”).
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such as these in mind.12 Judges worry, for example, that workers
will overestimate the extent of their contractual protection against
discharge.13 In response, courts have adopted default rules of
interpretation that encourage employers to contract expressly for an
at-will relationship.14 Similarly, the drafters of the Uniform
Commercial Code sought to protect consumers who might otherwise
misunderstand the extent of their rights against the seller of a
defective product.15 Section 2-316 thus establishes a warranty of
merchantability as a default term, and permits sellers to avoid
granting that warranty only by including a sufficiently clear dis-
claimer in the sales documents.16 As one might expect, employers
and product manufacturers routinely opt out of these default rules.17
They craft express contract language that simultaneously protects
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See, e.g., Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1264-65, 1269, modified,
499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985) (holding that employee handbook would be construed “in accordance
with the reasonable expectations of the employees,” finding that “it would be almost inevitable
for an employee to regard it as a binding commitment, legally enforceable, concerning the
terms and conditions of his employment,” and chastising the employer for “circulat[ing] a
document so likely to lead employees into believing they had job security”).
14. See infra Part I.D.1. For earlier suggestions that these employment contract doctrines
might serve a legal-information-forcing function, see J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspec-
tive on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts: Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 WIS.
L. REV. 837, 885; Verkerke, supra note 8, at 24, 64.
15. See U.C.C. § 2-316 cmt. 1 (2012) (“[This section] seeks to protect a buyer from
unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer by denying effect to such language when
inconsistent with language of express warranty and permitting exclusion of implied
warranties only by conspicuous language or other circumstances which protect the buyer from
surprise.”).
16. See id. § 2-316.
17. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The Implied Warranty of Merchantability in Software
Contracts: A Warranty No One Dares to Give and How to Change That, 16 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 393, 398-99 (1997) (noting that parties routinely avail themselves of the
warranty disclaimer provisions of the U.C.C.); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and
the Quality of Standard Form Contracts: The Case of Software License Agreements, 5 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 450 (2008) (documenting terms of 647 software license
agreements); Yvonne W. Rosmarin, Consumers-R-Us: A Reality in the U.C.C. Article 2
Revision Process, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1593, 1610 & n.67 (1994) (“Disclaimers of
warranties in consumer sales transactions are used so frequently that the absence of
disclaimers is conspicuous. In fact, the typical clause disclaiming implied warranties often
attempts to disclaim any express warranties as well, contrary to the express language of § 2-
316(1).”); Verkerke, supra note 14, at 867-68, 873 (finding that 52 percent of all surveyed
employers, and 66 percent of those who had terms governing discharge, contracted expressly
for an at-will relationship).
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their interests and, at least in theory, informs consumers and
workers of the legal rule that will govern their relationship.
As these examples illustrate, legal-information-forcing rules have
a common structure. First, the ostensible purpose of the rule is to
encourage legally sophisticated parties to inform comparatively
unsophisticated parties about their legal rights and obligations.
Second, each is a default term designed to favor the interests of the
unsophisticated party. Finally, the overwhelming majority of
sophisticated parties respond to the rule by contracting around the
default, adding language to the contract that better protects the
interests of the drafter. What therefore distinguishes a legal-
information-forcing rule from other defaults is (1) its goal of
dispelling legal ignorance, (2) the fact that the rule initially favors
the less sophisticated party, and (3) the frequency of opt-outs.
Rules of this type are remarkably ubiquitous.18 I argue, however,
that there are good reasons to doubt that many achieve their goal
of informing unsophisticated parties about the law. These rules
instead generate a profusion of boilerplate language in largely
unread contract documents. In fact, most people fail most of the
time to read most of the terms in the contracts they sign.19 As a
result, a legal-information-forcing strategy seems unlikely to
succeed. 
We can easily imagine regulatory innovations designed to make
the contracting process more informative. Lawmakers could impose
procedural requirements for opting out of the default rule in an
18. See infra Part I.D (describing examples of legal-information-forcing rules).
19. See, e.g., NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 3 (2013)
(criticizing the modern tendency to enforce unread click-wrap and browse-wrap contract
terms); MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE
RULE OF LAW 12-14 (2013) (arguing that boilerplate terms go unread and that this fact vitiates
consumer consent to those terms); Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print?
Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2014) (documenting
that “only one or two of every 1,000 retail software shoppers access the license agreement and
that most of those who do access it read no more than a small portion”); Todd D. Rakoff,
Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1179 (1983) (“[T]he
adhering party is in practice unlikely to have read the standard terms before signing the
document and is unlikely to have understood them if he has read them. Virtually every
scholar who has written about contracts of adhesion has accepted the truth of this assertion,
and the few empirical studies that have been done have agreed.”); Elisabeth Leamy, Savvy
Consumer: Read Your Contract's Fine Print, ABC NEWS (Aug. 18, 2006), http://abcnews.go.
com/Business/CreativeConsumer/story?id=2325920 [http:// perma.cc/TKR4-BCVR].
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attempt to force laypeople to pay more attention to specific terms.20
For example, many courts emphasize considerations such as
typographical prominence, separate signing, and linguistic clarity
in deciding whether to enforce terms that displace a legal-
information-forcing default.21 Lawmakers could adopt even more
aggressive approaches, such as requiring an oral recitation of all or
part of the contract, quizzing parties about their understanding of
key contract terms, or perhaps mandating the participation of an
attorney in certain transactions. Careful empirical study might even
help us determine which, if any, of these requirements are effective.
However, people are often rationally ignorant about contract terms.
In these circumstances, the cost of calling their attention to specific
terms quickly overwhelms any potential benefit from being better
informed. Thus, no cost-effective strategy is likely to make these
express terms truly informative for the majority of unsophisticated
parties.
This rather pessimistic assessment of legal-information-forcing
rules suggests that courts and legislators may be mistaken to rely
on them to combat legal ignorance. In short, the conventional
information-forcing justification for these rules is unpersuasive. But
perhaps legal-information-forcing defaults can be explained and
justified on other grounds. Part III of this Article recasts the rules
as “clause-forcing” and explores several alternative accounts of how
20. For an example of such a proposal in the context of employment contracting, see
Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights, and Why Does It Matter?,
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6, 8, 26 (2002) [hereinafter Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees]; and
Cynthia L. Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 63 STAN. L. REV.
351, 363-69 (2011) [hereinafter Estlund, Just the Facts]. For a more pessimistic assessment
of a similar effort focused on consumer lending, see Willis, supra note 6, at 201-02, 264.
21. See, e.g., Jones v. Cent. Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 788 (Alaska 1989)
(refusing to enforce one-sentence handbook disclaimer because it was insufficiently conspicu-
ous); McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. 789 P.2d 866, 870-71 (Wyo. 1990) (Golden, J.,
concurring) (emphasizing that the company’s disclaimer of just cause protection was not
capitalized and that it was located in a general welcoming section of the handbook). The
movement to promote or require consumer contracts to be formulated in “plain language”
aims in a similar direction. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702 (McKinney 2014) (“[A plain
language requirement is imposed on written agreements] for the lease of space to be occupied
for residential purposes, for the lease of personal property to be used primarily for personal,
family or household purposes or to which a consumer is a party and the money, property or
service which is the subject of the transaction is primarily for personal, family or household
purposes.”); 37 PA. CODE §§ 307.1-307.10 (1999) (imposing a pre-approval requirement for
certain consumer contracts and establishing standards of review for readability).
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the resulting express contract terms might serve socially beneficial
purposes.22 
First, these rules may produce express contract terms that inform
an important subset of parties. For example, easy access to detailed
contract terms could facilitate the activities of avid comparison
shoppers, consumer advocates, and reviewers. Their scrutiny of
these terms may indirectly benefit the majority of unsophisticated
parties who elect not to read the contract.23 Alternatively, the
express terms may be valuable only after a dispute has arisen. The
more detailed contract language could increase the ex post clarity
of the parties’ legal rights and thus lower dispute resolution costs.24
Or finally, and most controversially, these exculpatory terms may
be an effort on the part of sophisticated parties to replace legal
enforcement of the parties’ rights with a norm-governed system that
operates largely outside of the traditional legal system.25 Thus,
parties may rely on informal market norms to enforce their
commitments with less certainty, but more cheaply, than through
litigation. These cost savings potentially produce higher profits for
firms, lower prices for consumers, and increased wages for workers.
On this account of clause-forcing defaults, the role of the judiciary
is simply to decide when exculpatory language goes too far. Courts
22. Part III also discusses how legal-information-forcing rules are related to the large and
growing literature that proposes to use “sticky” default rules to shift contract terms and
behavior in socially desirable ways. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. BARR ET AL., AN OPT-OUT HOME
MORTGAGE SYSTEM (2008); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008); Cass R. Sunstein, Human
Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205, 207, 224 (2001) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Human Behavior]; Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106 (2002)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule]. For a more critical assessment of this
strategy, see Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155,
1227 (2013).
23. See infra notes 202-03 and accompanying text. See generally Schwartz & Wilde, supra
note 6.
24. See infra Part III.C. 
25. See infra Part III.D. See generally ELLICKSON, supra note 1; Lisa Bernstein, Opting
Out of the Legal System: Extra-Legal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J.
LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) [hereinafter Bernstein, Opting Out]; Lisa Bernstein, Private
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and
Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001) [hereinafter Bernstein, Creating Cooperation];
Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC.
REV. 55 (1963); Barack D. Richman, How Communities Create Economic Advantage: Jewish
Diamond Merchants in New York, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 383 (2006).
2015] LEGAL IGNORANCE AND INFORMATION-FORCING RULES 909
must determine whether public policy requires certain legal
liabilities to persist despite the efforts of sophisticated parties to
exclude them.26
A comprehensive positive explanation for the widespread use of
clause-forcing rules will likely involve elements of each of these
stories. And it is impossible to know whether a particular rule is
normatively defensible until we discover what purpose it serves, and
how well it achieves that goal. Embracing any of these alternatives,
however, has profound implications for the design of the rules
themselves. The goal of ex post legal clarity, for example, demands
only that parties commit their preferred terms to writing and
express them clearly.27 Courts’ current preoccupation with promi-
nence and the typographical aspects of express terms is pointless if
the terms only have value once a dispute arises. If, however,
sophisticated parties use exculpatory clauses principally to substi-
tute norms for law as a means of contract enforcement, then courts
need to recognize this motivation and analyze how these clauses
affect contractual relations in the relevant market. A deeper
understanding of these practices will help lawmakers develop more
coherent doctrinal rules to police the line between acceptable
reliance on informal norms and objectionably exculpatory contract
terms. Although it may be impossible to know whether these clause-
forcing rules are normatively desirable, my analysis demonstrates
the conceptual poverty of current judicial and legislative approaches
that assume these express contract terms inform most parties.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces the concept
of an information-forcing default rule, shows how that concept
applies to the problem of legal ignorance, and offers a number of
examples of legal-information-forcing default rules. Part II identifies
a significant problem with the conventional information-forcing just-
ification. People often pay no attention to the express contract terms
that these rules encourage. It also reviews the existing scholarly
literature on disclosure regulations and on adhesion contracts for
26. The scholarly debate about the proper regulation of boilerplate terms in contracts
raises very similar issues. See, e.g., RADIN, supra note 19 (arguing that regulatory agencies
have fallen short in their oversight of the use of boilerplate clauses); BEN-SHAHAR &
SCHNEIDER, supra note 3 (discussing the regulation of boilerplate clauses).
27. See infra Part III.C.
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ideas about how to address this problem. Part III develops and
critiques several alternative justifications for the clause-forcing
rules on which the Article is focused. This Part also shows that
adopting any of these alternative justifications will require courts
and commentators to rethink existing doctrinal requirements, and
to develop a more nuanced understanding of how clause-forcing
defaults affect contracting practices.
I. THE PERVASIVENESS OF INFORMATION-FORCING JUSTIFICATIONS
In this Part, I explain the origins of information-forcing contract
default rules, extend the basic theory to encompass problems of
legal ignorance, reexamine the conventional information-forcing
account of the Hadley rule, and illustrate how pervasively lawmak-
ers have embraced legal-information-forcing arguments.
A. Origins
So what precisely is an information-forcing rule? As I will use the
term, it is any contract default rule that favors one party in order to
induce the other party to a transaction to disclose particular
information. If the disfavored party fails to provide the targeted
information, then that party suffers a legal disadvantage associated
with a comparatively unfavorable default rule. By providing legally
adequate disclosure to a transactional partner, however, the
disfavored party may escape the undesirable default. This definition
thus excludes any law that imposes civil or criminal penalties for
nondisclosure.28 Such affirmative disclosure duties serve a similar
purpose but operate through a different mechanism. My focus here
is on situations in which disclosing parties may opt into different
and more favorable rules by providing the required information to
their transactional partner. As we will see, even this restrictive
28. Examples of direct disclosure duties include Securities and Exchange Commission
prospectus requirements, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 16.3 (2014), Food and Drug
Administration food labeling regulations, 15 U.S.C. § 1453 (2012); 21 C.F.R. § 101.3 (2014),
and Employee Retirement Income Security Act rules requiring plan sponsors to provide
summary plan descriptions to participants, 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-3 (2013).
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definition encompasses a plethora of judge-made and legislatively
enacted rules found in diverse substantive areas of law.29
Note that a so-called “penalty default” rule that specifies a term
undesirable to both parties also could be used to induce parties to
negotiate over that contract term.30 Although it has become conven-
tional for commentators to refer to both information-forcing and
negotiation-forcing rules as “penalty defaults,”31 the term perhaps
makes more sense applied to rules in the latter category that truly
penalize both parties for failing to reach an explicit agreement. In
the interest of analytical clarity, this Article focuses exclusively on
the potential information-forcing function of default rules that favor
one party over another.
Although the rules themselves have been around for a long time,
academic attention to the theory of information-forcing rules
originated among economically oriented scholars examining what is
now one of the most thoroughly debated contract doctrines—the
foreseeability limitation on consequential damages.32 Among con-
temporary contract theorists, the canonical justification for limiting
the recovery of consequential damages to those that are foreseeable
in the ordinary course of business is an information-forcing
rationale.33 According to this approach, courts presume that both
parties know the ordinary damages that are likely to flow from a
breach of contract. If, however, “special circumstances” will produce
29. See infra Part I.D. 
30. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 9, at 91.
31. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Ya-Huh: There Are and Should Be Penalty Defaults, 33 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 589, 606 (2006) (noting that environmental regulation standards may act as threat
points in negotiations); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Environmental Regula-
tion, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 861, 865 (2006) (describing the information-forcing character of
penalty default rules).
32. For the rule, see Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 150-51; 9 Ex. 341, 354-55
(1854). For the academic debate, see, for example, Barry Adler, The Questionable Ascent of
Hadley v. Baxendale, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1547 (1999) (challenging the significance of the
prevailing understanding of the Hadley rule); Ayres & Gertner, supra note 9 (developing the
concept of a “penalty default” rule); Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Information and
the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 284 (1991) (presenting a model similar to Ayres & Gertner’s explanation for the
Hadley rule); Goetz & Scott, supra note 9 (referring to the information-forcing function of
some default rules); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of
Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990) (questioning whether strategic consid-
erations might prevent buyers from disclosing their private information).
33. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 9, at 101.
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greater than ordinary losses, then the party who knows about those
circumstances must share that information with the other party
prior to contracting.34 Only after obtaining at least implied consent
to bear this additional risk can the better-informed party hope to
recover for more than ordinary losses in the event of a contract
breach.35 Thus, the default rule of limited liability encourages one
party to reveal information that he or she would rather not disclose.
A real-world example will make this analysis more concrete.
Imagine that you are shipping a box of books and a box of diamonds
to a dear friend in another state. You deliver both boxes to a
common carrier and pay standard shipping charges based on the
weight and size of the boxes.36 If the carrier inadvertently loses one
of the boxes in transit, your economic losses depend critically on
whether the lost box contained books or diamonds. Under the
prevailing default rule for consequential damages, however, your
potential recovery is limited to an amount the court considers
foreseeable in these circumstances. Ordinary damages would almost
surely cover the loss of your books. But a recovery limited to
foreseeable consequential damages would protect only a tiny
fraction of the value of your diamonds. In order to be compensated
fully for the loss of your diamonds, you must therefore inform the
carrier of this “special circumstance” at the time of contracting. The
carrier in turn will take more appropriate precautions to prevent
loss, and will undoubtedly charge you a price sufficient to cover both
the cost of those precautions and any residual risk of loss. The
limited liability default rule has thus “forced” you to reveal informa-
tion about the damages you will suffer if the carrier loses your
34. See Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151.
35. See U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (2012) (allowing recovery of “any loss from general or
particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason
to know”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1981) (barring recovery “for loss that
the party in breach did not have reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach when the
contract was made”). Modern courts also apply the Hadley rule. See, e.g., Spang Indus. v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 512 F.2d 365, 368 (5th Cir. 1975); Turner's Farms, Inc. v. Me. Cent.
R.R., 486 F. Supp. 694, 699 (D. Me. 1980).
36. I recognize that this scenario omits or misrepresents several important features of
real-world shipping contracts. Nevertheless, my description accurately captures the
transactional model on which most conventional discussions of the Hadley rule rest. I
reexamine a more realistic version of this transaction in Part I.C below.
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shipment. As a result, the carrier can take efficient precautions and
charge you an efficient price for this service.
A considerable literature has explored a variety of difficulties,
qualifications, and limitations of this information-forcing rationale
for a default rule limiting consequential damages. For example, the
“special circumstances” that a party must disclose before contracting
may simultaneously reveal important private information about the
value of the contract to that party.37 Someone who informs a
prospective contractual partner that a breach will cause unusually
large lost profits has also signaled that he or she may be willing to
pay an unusually high price for performance. Ordinarily, competi-
tion can be expected to drive the contract asking price down to the
cost of providing the relevant goods or services plus the cost of
bearing any unusual risk of loss from breach. In imperfectly
competitive markets, however, these competing strategic consider-
ations discourage disclosure and may diminish the effectiveness of
an information-forcing rule.38
Eric Posner even goes so far as to question whether penalty
default rules exist at all.39 He directs his criticism principally at Ian
Ayres and Robert Gertner’s frequently cited article that first used
the term “penalty default” to describe nonmajoritarian rules that
have an information-forcing effect.40 Although Ayres and Gertner
applied this concept to a variety of legal rules, the Hadley foresee-
ability limitation on consequential damages motivated their analy-
sis and served as the canonical illustration of a penalty default.
Subsequent scholarly discussion of the penalty default theory has
similarly focused disproportionate attention on the Hadley rule.41 
According to Posner, however, it is unclear whether even this
pivotal example is properly understood as a penalty default.42 He
contends that the foreseeability limitation may instead be majori-
tarian because carriers have no comparative advantage in providing
37. See Johnston, supra note 32, at 616.
38. See id. at 634.
39. Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 33 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 563, 565 (2006).
40. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 9, at 91.
41. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 32, at 1548; Johnston, supra note 32, at 615.
42. Posner, supra note 39, at 574-75.
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insurance against lost shipments.43 Alternatively, Posner suggests
that liability for unforeseeable losses would not affect carriers’
precautions, and thus carriers need not internalize those costs in
order to ensure that they take efficient precautions.44 He concludes
that the Hadley rule is not a penalty default either because it is
majoritarian or because “it does not reflect the factors in Ayres and
Gertner’s model.”45 Turning to Ayres and Gertner’s other examples
of penalty defaults, Posner characterizes some as “legal formal-
it[ies],” others as “formation doctrines,” and still others as “interpre-
tive presumptions.”46 He contends principally that the rules in these
distinct doctrinal categories are not defaults because they do not fill
gaps in a preexisting contract.47 Moreover, Posner offers an
alternative majoritarian explanation for many of these contract
doctrines.
In his response to Posner’s criticisms, Ian Ayres observes that
Posner’s doctrinal formalism obscures the fact that contract
formalities, formation doctrines, interpretive presumptions, and
conventional default rules are often functionally equivalent.48 Each
of these types of rules selects terms to govern the contractual
relationship between two parties. Yet those parties usually remain
free to specify explicitly the contract terms that they prefer, or to
reject contractual obligations altogether. Ayres maintains that, far
from being majoritarian, rules such as contra proferentem, which
Posner classifies as an interpretive presumption, operate as non-
majoritarian, information-forcing defaults.49 Indeed, Ayres equates
information-forcing and penalty defaults and offers a ten-page
litany of quotes from scholars who have used one or both terms to
describe a breathtaking variety of legal rules.50 
Turning to Hadley itself, Ayres acknowledges that it “is not the
cleanest example of a penalty default” because it does not “induc[e]
43. Id. at 575.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 574.
46. Id. at 576-78.
47. Id. at 566-67.
48. Ayres, supra note 31, at 617.
49. Id. at 596.
50. Id. at 601-11.
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a majority of contractors to contract around the default,”51 and thus
can plausibly be seen as majoritarian.52 After all, most contracting
parties would want a rule that prevents an opportunistic minority
from strategically withholding information. In terms of our earlier
example, people shipping books have no interest in paying for
precautions designed to protect the carrier from losses associated
with misplacing the occasional shipment of diamonds. But Ayres
argues that the Hadley rule remains a “powerful [example of
penalty defaults] because its efficiency stems from its inducing some
contractors to contract around the default, rather than from
enabling parties to save on the costs of contracting around it.”53
My own approach to the debate about Hadley depends on
understanding the case in terms that I develop in the next Section,
and thus I revisit Hadley immediately thereafter. For the moment,
simply note that the information-forcing argument for limited
consequential damages is a specific application of the more general
principle of comparative advantage.54 Efficiency-minded courts and
commentators select contract default rules by asking which party
can more cheaply perform or bear particular risks of nonperfor-
mance. The information-forcing argument extends this basic notion
of comparative advantage and considers which party is in the best
position to disclose information relevant to the transaction. In the
context of the Hadley rule for consequential damages, it is informa-
tion about factual circumstances, such as expected lost profits or
alternative sources of supply, that the rule encourages one party to
disclose. As we will see in the next Section, however, information
about the legal rules that govern a transaction can also be the object
of information-forcing rules.
B. Information-Forcing Theory Applied to Legal Ignorance
The hoary maxim “ignorance of the law is no excuse” expresses a
strong presumption that individuals are adequately informed about
51. Id. at 613.
52. See id. at 612; Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults,
51 STAN. L. REV. 1591, 1606 (1999); Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Default Rule Project, 6 VA.
J. 84, 85-86 (2003).
53. Ayres, supra note 31, at 612.
54. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 9, at 1299.
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prevailing legal rules.55 Regardless of whether that presumption is
justified in the criminal context from which it arises, abundant em-
pirical evidence reveals widespread ignorance about many aspects
of civil law.56 People often lack basic information about the legal
rules governing particular transactions in which they routinely
participate. Ignorance about product warranties, termination stan-
dards, damage limitations, insurance exclusions, or pension pro-
visions may potentially distort important economic decisions, and
could produce serious allocative inefficiency. When people do not
know important legal characteristics of the things they buy, their
willingness to pay may not accurately reflect their true valuation of
those products and services.
The argument for information-forcing default rules suggests a
possible solution to this problem of legal ignorance: we could treat
legal information just as we do information about the expected con-
sequential damages resulting from a breach of contract. Lawmakers
could determine whether one party has a comparative advantage in
obtaining and communicating information about the law governing
this transaction. If so, a legal-information-forcing rule would force
the comparatively better informed party to choose between reveal-
ing the relevant legal information or accepting a default rule that
favors the less informed party. Such a rule contrasts sharply with
a conventional “majoritarian default” selected to mimic the terms
that most parties would prefer for this type of transaction. Instead,
lawmakers choose the default knowing that the overwhelming
majority of well-informed parties will opt out. 
A surprisingly large number of common law and statutory rules
take this form.57 They seem designed to force a legally sophisticated
party to inform unsophisticated parties about the prevailing legal
standard. Judicial opinions and legislation often make this legal-
55. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 517 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Under ordinary
circumstances, ignorance of the law is no excuse for committing a crime.”); MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.02(2)(d)(9) (1962) (“Neither knowledge nor recklessness or negligence as to whether
conduct constitutes an offense or as to the existence, meaning or application of the law
determining the elements of an offense is an element of such offense, unless the definition of
the offense or the Code so provides.”).
56. See ELLICKSON, supra note 1, at 144-45; Austin Sarat, Support for the Legal System:
An Analysis of Knowledge, Attitude and Behavior, 3 AM. POL. Q. 1, 7 (1975); William & Hall,
supra note 2, at 114-19; Legal Knowledge of Michigan Citizens, supra note 2, at 1467-75.
57. See infra Parts I.C-D.
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information-forcing objective explicit.58 For other rules, however, an
implicit legal-information-forcing rationale is the most plausible
explanation for their structure. 
All of these legal rules share two common characteristics. First,
they are defaults because sophisticated parties may avoid the
unfavorable rule by drafting express contract terms, which simul-
taneously provide legal information to their contractual partners.
Second, the best evidence that a rule’s primary purpose is to
encourage one party to provide legal information to another is the
empirical observation that the overwhelming majority of legally
sophisticated parties choose to contract around it. Of course, a court
might create such a rule in an unsuccessful attempt to identify a
majoritarian default.59 But a more plausible—and more charita-
ble—explanation for default rules subject to routine opt-outs is that
the rules aim, at least implicitly, to increase the amount of legal
information contained in these contracts.
A legal-information-forcing justification for these default rules
also sidesteps one problem that conventional information-forcing
arguments must confront. As we saw earlier, the standard economic
explanation for the Hadley foreseeability limitation rests on the
rule’s ability to elicit information about the costs of breach from the
better informed party.60 Critics have observed that parties engaged
in strategic bargaining may legitimately object to revealing their
58. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 894-95 (Mich. 1980)
(suggesting that employers could avoid liability by making known to employees that personnel
policies are subject to unilateral change by their employer); Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche,
Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1271, modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985) (“It would be unfair to allow an
employer to distribute a policy manual that makes the workforce believe that certain promises
have been made and then to allow the employer to renege on those promises.... [I]f the
employer ... does not want the manual to be capable of being construed by the court as a
binding contract ... [then the employer should include] an appropriate statement that there
is no promise of any kind by the employer contained in the manual.”); Thompson v. St. Regis
Paper Co. 685 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Wash. 1984) (suggesting that employers could avoid liability
by specifically stating “in a conspicuous manner” that contents are not intended to be part of
the employment relationship, or by specifically asserting the employer’s right to modify
policies); U.C.C. § 2-316 (2012). See generally Verkerke, supra note 8, at 25, 51-59 (doc-
umenting the legal-information-forcing purpose behind employee handbook doctrine).
59. Or perhaps the court has other purposes in mind such as consumer protection, social
justice, or distributional equity. For discussion of majoritarian default rules from an economic
perspective, see generally Goetz & Scott, supra note 9.
60. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
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private value of performance to prospective contractual partners.61
Sophisticated parties, however, cannot plausibly claim that they
have a right to conceal the legal terms governing a transaction.
Nevertheless, a critic who sought to encourage self-reliance might
contend that a principle of caveat emptor should shield parties from
any duty to inform their transactional partners about the law.
Although such an argument implies that we must decide how best
to encourage uninformed parties to learn about the prevailing legal
rules, it is difficult to argue that one party should have a right to
conceal relevant legal information. An objection on these grounds
thus requires us to compare alternative means of conveying legal
information, but does not call into question the advisability of mak-
ing this information available to all.
Despite this apparent advantage, a legal-information-forcing
default could create other strategic problems. Sophisticated parties
may be reluctant to call attention to exculpatory or self-serving
rules by enshrining them in express contract terms. Potential con-
tractual partners—at least those who read the terms before signing
the agreement—could interpret such terms as a signal that the
contract drafter plans to renege on his or her obligations, or
otherwise behave in an uncooperative fashion.62 However, the
informational value of such a signal diminishes significantly when
the law strongly encourages one party to contract expressly for any
particular advantageous term. Indeed, if the practice of contracting
around the default rule becomes nearly universal—as it is in the
overwhelming majority of examples discussed below—then this
signal no longer distinguishes among possible contractual part-
ners.63 The danger of adverse signaling thus plays little role in
evaluating the costs and benefits of legal-information-forcing default
rules.
61. See Johnston, supra note 32, at 616.
62. For examples of suggestions that express contract terms function as signals, see Omri
Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651
(2006); and Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signalling, 23 R. J. ECON. 432 (1992).
For an influential application of signaling theory to the employment relationship, see Michael
Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973). In a more practice-oriented vein, see
Julius M. Steiner & Allan M. Dabrow, The Questionable Value of the Inclusion of Language
Confirming Employment At-Will Status in Company Personnel Documents, 37 LAB. L.J. 639,
644 (1986).
63. See Willis, supra note 22.
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C. The Hadley Rule Revisited
So what can the theory of legal-information-forcing defaults tell
us about the venerable rule of Hadley v. Baxendale? To answer this
question, recall our earlier example of shipping a box of books and
a box of diamonds.64 As we saw, the foreseeability limitation
arguably “forces” you to reveal information about the damages you
will suffer if the carrier loses your shipment of diamonds. It thus
allows the carrier to take efficient precautions and charge you an
efficient price for the service.65 Our initial analysis, however,
ignored important features of the legal rule and inaccurately
described common contracting practices for transactions of this type.
The conventional economic analysis of the Hadley foreseeability
limitation models the rule as one that awards the normal damages
that a low-valuation shipper suffers in the event of breach.66 In our
example, foreseeable damages cover the cost of a box of books but
not a box of diamonds. The stark contrast between books and
diamonds (or between high-valuation and low-valuation shippers in
the conventional model), however, obscures the fact that even the
restrictive Hadley rule exposes the carrier to an uncertain distribu-
tion of damage liability in the event of breach. A fact-finder might
conclude on the evidence in a particular case that “normal” or “ordi-
nary” losses include a comparatively high value for the books them-
selves and perhaps additional consequential damages for any delay
in obtaining replacement copies of the books.67 In contrast, another
case might place a comparatively low value on the books and ex-
clude more remote consequential losses entirely.68 The foreseeability
64. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
66. See Johnston, supra note 32, at 616.
67. Professor Eisenberg, among other scholars, has argued that “the trend of the cases has
been to relax the standard of foreseeability required under the principle of Hadley v.
Baxendale.” Melvin Eisenberg, The Principle of Hadley v. Baxendale, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 563,
610 (1992) (citing Hector Martinez & Co. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 606 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1979);
Wullschleger & Co. v. Jenny Fashions, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Prutch v. Ford
Motor Co., 618 P.2d 657 (Colo. 1980); Miles v. Kavanaugh, 350 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977); Midland Hotel Corp. v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 515 N.E.2d 61 (Ill. 1987); R.I.
Lampus Co. v. Neville Cement Prods. Corp., 378 A.2d 288 (Pa. 1977)).
68. For comparatively narrow readings of the Hadley rule, see McMillain Lumber Co. v.
First National Bank, 110 So. 602 (Ala. 1926); F & B Ceco, Inc. v. Galaxy Studios, Inc., 201 So.
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rule is thus more “mud” than “crystal” in the evocative terminology
often used to describe uncertain standards and precise rules.69
The conventional analysis of Hadley also presumes that carriers
allow low-valuation shippers—those shipping a box of books—to
remain silent and accept the default rule of foreseeable damages.
Yet anyone who has dealt with UPS or FedEx is surely aware that
many express “Terms and Conditions” become part of the written
contract. Taking the FedEx “U.S. Airbill” as an example, the face of
the form includes a space for “Total Declared Value,” and a fine-
print footnote that explains: “Our liability is limited to US$100
unless you declare a higher value. See back for details. By using this
Airbill you agree to the service conditions on the back of this Airbill
and in the current FedEx Service Guide, including terms that limit
our liability.”70
The summary of terms on the reverse side of the Airbill reiterates
the $100 liability limitation and explains additional limits on the
maximum allowable declared value.71 Tellingly, these terms ex-
pressly disclaim liability for loss of any kind in excess of the
declared value, and they also restrict the maximum declared value
to $1,000 for packages containing “items of extraordinary value,”
such as “jewelry” and “precious metals.”72
The Hadley rule undoubtedly shapes the prototypical modern
carriage contract, but not through the mechanism that conventional
information-forcing theory proposes. No sensible carrier relies on
the foreseeability limitation to protect itself against the excessive
damage claims of high-value shippers. Instead, like FedEx, all mod-
ern carriers contract expressly for a precise—and far lower—limit
on their liability.73 In addition, carriers offer a menu of options for
2d 597 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Marcus & Co. v. K.L.G. Baking Co., 3 A.2d 627 (N.J. 1939);
Czarnikow-Rionda Co. v. Fed. Sugar Refining Co., 173 N.E. 913 (N.Y. 1930); Keystone Diesel
Engine Co. v. Irwin, 191 A.2d 376 (Pa. 1963), overruled by R.I. Lampus Co. v. Neville Cement
Products Corp., 378 A.2d 288 (Pa. 1977); Longview Construction & Development, Inc. v.
Loggins Construction Co., 523 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); and Head & Guild
Equipment Co. v. Bond, 470 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
69. The seminal invocation of this widely used metaphor is Carol M. Rose, Crystals and
Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988).
70. FedEx Express New Package U.S. Airbill (revision date 1/2012) (on file with author).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Companies in the moving industry similarly negotiate an express valuation for the
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shippers to cover more valuable items at additional cost.74 For their
part, low-value shippers never have an opportunity to accept the
default rule of foreseeable damages for loss. Instead, carriers’
uniform practice requires shippers either to accept a comparatively
low fixed liability limitation or to declare a value and pay for greater
coverage.75
Considering how thoroughly the Hadley example dominates the
literature on information-forcing defaults, it may be somewhat
surprising to learn that legal-information-forcing theory describes
the practical consequences of the Hadley rule more accurately than
the conventional account. Recall that a legal-information-forcing
purpose is often the best explanation for unfavorable default rules
from which sophisticated parties routinely opt out.76 According to
the conventional theory, the foreseeability limitation provides
sufficient protection for promisors against unreasonable damage
claims.77 Carriers evidently do not share this assessment of the
doctrine. Their standard contracting practices reveal that they
consider the Hadley rule an unfavorable default. It exposes carriers
to greater expected liability than they wish to bear, and the
uncertainty inherent in a foreseeability analysis simply compounds
the problem. Carriers have responded by contracting around this
unfavorable default.78 Nevertheless, no court or legislature has
altered the default rule to match what standard industry practice
reveals to be the preference of all sophisticated market participants.
What can possibly explain this persistent nonmajoritarian default
rule? Ordinarily, carriers are better informed and more legally
sophisticated than most of their clients. Thus, one plausible account
is that lawmakers intend, or at the very least accept, that the
default rule will induce legally sophisticated parties to provide infor-
mation about the prevailing legal rules to their less knowledgeable
goods they transport and contractually limit potential recovery for loss or damage to that
amount. See, e.g., 5 S.C. JUR. CARRIERS § 51 (discussing common carriers’ ability to
contractually limit liability).
74. See, e.g., UPS Air Freight Terms and Conditions of Contract (“Terms”) for UPS Air
Freight Services in the United States, Canada, and International, UPS 36 (July 7, 2014),
http://www.ups.com/media/en/AirFreight_TandC.pdf [http://perma.cc/F46W-ZSLS].
75. Id.
76. See supra Part I.B.
77. See supra Part I.B.
78. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
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contractual partners. Because express liability limitations are so
pervasive, courts now rarely, if ever, have an opportunity to discuss
how the Hadley rule applies to transactions of this type. Neverthe-
less, the legal-information-forcing theory fits the available facts far
better than the conventional information-forcing story. It can
explain why legally sophisticated parties routinely opt out, and why
courts might believe that the resulting express contract terms are
a socially beneficial consequence of this nonmajoritarian default.
Moreover, judges have explicitly invoked a legal-information-forcing
purpose in adopting other related contract doctrines—such as the
contra proferentem presumption and unconscionability—that are
designed, at least in part, to encourage companies to inform unso-
phisticated parties about their contractual rights.79
My claim is not that the Hadley court crafted foreseeability
doctrine for its legal-information-forcing effect, nor do I argue that
subsequent decisions necessarily rest on that rationale. Instead, I
contend that if information-forcing effects explain the Hadley rule
at all, then it is legal information that the rule itself is forcing. The
doctrine induces sophisticated parties to draft express contract
terms, and those terms in turn force shippers and other similar
parties to disclose their expected loss from breach. The sophisticated
parties then use this information to adjust their precautions and
pricing according to the level of risk. In contrast, the conventional
theory erroneously suggests that the rule itself separates high-
valuation from low-valuation shippers.80
Finally, it is worth noting that the Hadley rule also supplies the
default damage rule for transactions outside of the shipping context
on which we have focused. But the rule itself, as opposed to the
express liability limitations it engenders, determines damages in a
surprisingly narrow set of circumstances. Consumer contracts of all
kinds routinely exclude liability for consequential damages or
impose a low, fixed limit on total liability. Commercial contracts for
goods and services ordinarily contain a clause excluding consequen-
tial losses, and they also frequently specify liquidated damages in
79. For additional discussion of these doctrines, see infra notes 226-27 and accompanying
text.
80. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 52, at 1606 (making this claim); Johnston, supra
note 32, at 621-23 (modeling the Hadley rule in strategic terms).
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lieu of the default expectation measure. Construction contracts
sometimes specify liquidated damages for delay, but they also
routinely contain a clause expressly excluding liability for conse-
quential losses. Nevertheless, the question of whether particular
losses from breach were foreseeable occasionally arises, and the
conventional information-forcing story may well apply to some of
these cases.81 My goal here has been simply to call attention to the
surprising frequency of opt-outs and the plausibility of the legal-
information-forcing theory as a potential justification for a rule that
principally leads sophisticated parties to draft express terms that
negate the default rule.
D. Some Additional Examples
As we have seen, the basic theoretical argument for information-
forcing rules extends quite readily to rules designed to encourage
parties to disclose legal information. It should perhaps be unsurpris-
ing then that courts and legislatures frequently adopt contract
default rules for the apparent purpose of dispelling legal ignorance.
1. Implied Just-Cause Employment Contracts
Consider first the legal rules that determine the terms governing
discharge from employment. Although the default rule in all but one
major U.S. jurisdiction is employment at-will,82 the willingness of
courts to enforce implied agreements for just-cause protection
strongly encourages employers to contract expressly for an at-will
relationship.83 In fact, many judicial decisions expressly invite em-
ployers to contract around courts’ liberal construction of employee
81. See, e.g., Webco Indus. v. Diamond, No. 11-CV-774-JHP-FHM, 2012 WL 5995740 (N.D.
Okla. Nov. 30, 2012) (discussing the relationship between the contract rule of Hadley and tort
law conceptions of foreseeability); Stone v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., 624 A.2d 496 (Md. 1993)
(involving a long sequence of causes for the promisee’s loss); Sunnyland Farms v. Cent. N.M.
Elec. Coop., 255 P.3d 324 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 301 P.3d 387 (N.M.
2013) (discussing foreseeability of contract damages resulting from a fire); Kenford Co. v.
County of Erie, 108 A.D.2d 132, 489 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (involving a damage claim for a
decline in value of adjoining land and loss of profits from developing that land).
82. See Verkerke, supra note 14, at 846. 
83. See id. at 867-68.
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handbooks and other informal assurances.84 Moreover, most courts
appear willing, even eager, to enforce express at-will terms so long
as they are phrased clearly and positioned prominently among the
documents presented to new employees at the time of hiring.85
These doctrines thus share the first characteristic of legal-
information-forcing rules—they are default rules subject to opt-out.
These doctrines satisfy the second criterion as well. Empirical
evidence of employment contract practices confirms that an
overwhelming majority of legally sophisticated parties contract
expressly for an at-will relationship. Most employers, and especially
larger, more sophisticated firms, use written confirmations of at-will
status.86 Because the prevailing default rule is employment at will,
these express terms are formally superfluous. Nevertheless, such
provisions have practical value because they tend to inoculate
employers against implied contract claims. A written confirmation
of at-will status ordinarily defeats a worker’s argument that she
understood her employer’s written or oral statements to imply a
commitment to provide just-cause protection.87 Employers commonly
combine an at-will confirmation with additional terms that bar oral
modification and specify that only specific corporate officers have
authority to modify the contract. These provisions opt out of two
other default rules—specifically the enforcement of oral agreements
and the agency doctrine of apparent authority—and provide addi-
tional protection against implied contract claims.88 
84. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980) (finding
that a for-cause provision may become part of the contract if the employer’s policy statements
supported the employee’s legitimate expectation of such a provision); Woolley v. Hoffman La-
Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985) (finding that termination
provisions in an employment manual were sufficient to support a fired employee’s claim of an
implied contract requiring good cause for discharge).
85. See, e.g., Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1103 (Cal. 2000) (“[The] express
disclaimer, reinforced by the statutory presumption of at-will employment, satisfied
[employer/defendant’s] initial burden, if any, to show that [employee/plaintiff ’s] claim of a
contract limiting [employer/defendant’s] termination rights had no merit.”).
86. See Verkerke, supra note 14, at 868.
87. Id. at 847.
88. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1981) (“A promise may be stated in
words either oral or written, or may be inferred wholly or partly from conduct.”);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.03 (2006) (“Apparent authority, as defined in § 2.03, is
created by a person's manifestation that another has authority to act with legal consequences
for the person who makes the manifestation, when a third party reasonably believes the actor
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Implied contract doctrine thus serves a legal-information-forcing
function in the employment setting. Courts reason that employers
should be bound to a just-cause contract whenever informal
assurances or company policies concerning job security would lead
a reasonable employee to believe that he had legal protection
against arbitrary discharge.89 Just as readily, however, those same
courts enforce formal disclaimers and confirmations of at-will status
contained in employee handbooks and on separate forms signed at
hiring.90 Judges assert that any reasonable employees who have
to be authorized and the belief is traceable to the manifestation.”).
89. See, e.g., Eales v. Tanana Valley Med.-Surgical Grp., 663 P.2d 958, 959 (Alaska 1983)
(holding that discharge without cause breached the employment contract when the employer
represented to an employee that “so long as he was properly performing his duties he would
not be discharged” until he reached retirement); Walker v. N. San Diego Cnty. Hosp. Dist.,
185 Cal. Rptr. 617, 621-22 (Ct. App. 1982) (stating that existence of implied in fact agreement
providing for just cause termination is an issue of fact for the jury); Stark v. Circle K Corp.,
751 P.2d 162, 166 (Mont. 1988) (holding that an employee who had an objectively reasonable
belief that he would only be fired for good cause may state a cause of action for breach of
contract); Woolley, 491 A.2d 1257 (finding an at-will employee to be protected by a for cause
implied promise in employee manual); Forrester v. Parker, 606 P.2d 191, 192 (N.M. 1980)
(stating that the conduct between employer and nonprobationary employee constituted an
implied employment contract under employer’s personnel policy guide); Weiner v. McGraw-
Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441 (N.Y. 1982) (holding that an at-will employee pleaded a good cause
of action for breach of contract where he was discharged without just cause despite protective
provisions in the employee handbook and alleged promises to employee).
90. See, e.g., Reid v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453, 456 (6th Cir. 1986) (considering
an employment application that included the statement: “In consideration of my employment,
I agree [that my] ... employment and compensation can be terminated with or without cause,
and with or without notice, at any time, at the option of either the Company or myself ”);
Gianaculas v. Trans World Airlines, 761 F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir. 1985) (considering an
employment application that contained the condition: “If given employment, I hereby agree
that such employment may be terminated by the company at any time without advance notice
and without liability to me for wages or salary”); Davis v. Lumacorp, Inc., 992 F. Supp. 1250
(D. Kan. 1998) (holding that an implied employment contract claim failed when a manager
signed an employment application containing a provision that employment was for no definite
period of time and could be terminated at any time without prior notice and with or without
cause); Chambers v. Valley Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 721 F. Supp. 1128, 1132 (D. Ariz. 1988); Guz
v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1103 (Cal. 2000); Arnold v. Diet Ctr., Inc., 746 P.2d 1040,
1041 n.1 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987) (enforcing as a matter of law a disclaimer that stated: “This
handbook is not an employment contract, and an employee can be terminated at any time”);
Castiglione v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 517 A.2d 786, 788 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (enforcing
on motion for summary judgment a disclaimer that stated: “[T]his handbook does not
constitute an express or implied contract. The employee may separate from his/her
employment at any time; the Hospital reserves the right to do the same”); Ryan v. Dan’s Food
Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395 (Utah 1998) (holding that a pharmacist’s receipt and acknow-
ledgment of a handbook, which notified him of his at-will status, revoked any express or
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read or signed such statements must now understand their unpro-
tected legal status.91 By opting out of the implied contract doctrine,
employers have thus provided what courts evidently consider valu-
able legal information.92 Workers exposed to these disclaimers
presumably learn the true nature of the legal terms governing
discharge from employment.
Finally, notice that both the implied contract doctrine and the
Hadley rule generate express exculpatory contract terms because
sophisticated parties believe that an ostensibly favorable doctrine
is insufficiently protective. We have already seen that carriers (and
most other suppliers of consumer products and services) worry that
the foreseeability standard is too generous and too vague.93 Like-
wise, employers have no confidence that the at-will default will
protect them from unjust discharge claims.94 Modern erosions of the
traditional employment-at-will doctrine invite litigation and encour-
age employers to confirm workers’ at-will status just as uncertainty
about foreseeability drives carriers to contract expressly for a more
protective damage rule.95
2. ERISA Rules
Case law under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) similarly includes numerous instances in which a plan
sponsor must include specific contract language in order to avoid an
unfavorable construction of its benefit plan. The Supreme Court’s
decision in Firestone Tire & Rubber v. Bruch, for example, attached
talismanic significance to highly specific terms found in the formal
implied contractual conditions contradictory to the handbook).
91. E.g., Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 473 N.W.2d 268, 275 (Mich. 1991) (“[The
signed ‘Rules of Personal Conduct’ sheet] did not contain elaborate disciplinary procedures
and, more importantly, did not contain the ‘release for just cause only’ language.... Plaintiff’s
agreement to abide by those rules suggests that any subjective belief she maintained that she
could only be dismissed for failure to obtain her quota was not reasonable.”).
92. Id.
93. See supra Part I.C.
94. See Verkerke, supra note 14, at 839 (“[A] series of doctrinal innovations ... has left the
at will rule significantly eroded.”).
95. Merger clauses that contract for a fully integrated agreement may serve a very similar
purpose. See, e.g., Albert Choi, The Parol Evidence Rule, Information Disclosure, and the
Value of an Oral Promise 11 (Univ. of Va. L. & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 17,
2009), available at http://perma.cc/L8QH-MKKG.
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plan.96 The Court opined that if, and only if, the employer includes
language giving the plan administrator discretionary authority to
interpret and construe the terms of the plan, then the administra-
tor’s decisions to deny benefits will be reviewed using a deferential
“arbitrary and capricious” standard.97 If the magical language is not
present, however, courts are to conduct a de novo review of all
benefit denials.98 Predictably, all well-counseled employers have
responded to this ruling by amending their benefit plans to include
the necessary terms.99 
The Court’s opinion in Firestone never specifically invoked an in-
formation-forcing rationale for its rule.100 Instead, Justice O’Connor
applied formal doctrinal rules from the law of trusts.101 Although
this doctrinal analysis has been subject to withering criticism,102 an
alternative justification for the Court’s ruling is that plan partici-
pants and beneficiaries should have some way of knowing what
standard of review will apply to their disputes with plan adminis-
trators. The specific language required by Firestone thus might alert
individuals that their plan administrator has significant discretion
over benefit payments. The Court’s decision establishing de novo
review as the default rule clearly permits opt-outs, and virtually
every plan now expressly grants the administrator discretionary
authority to interpret and construe the terms of the plan.103 In
96. 489 U.S. 101, 112 (1989).
97. Id. at 102.
98. Id. at 115 (“Consistent with established principles of trust law, we hold that a denial
of benefits challenged under § 1132(a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless
the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine
eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.”).
99. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 SUP. CT. REV.
207, 220 (“The Court's emphasis in Bruch on the trust instrument as the basis for deferential
review raises the prospect that an ERISA plan may opt out of Bruch's de novo review and
back into the pre-Bruch world of judicial deference merely by inserting some boilerplate to
that effect in the plan instrument.”).
100. Justice O’Connor explained: “In determining the appropriate standard of review for
actions under § 1132(a)(1)(B), we are guided by principles of trust law.” 489 U.S. at 111 (citing
Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985)).
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 99, at 218.
103. See, e.g., Beverly Cohen, Divided Loyalties: How the Metlife v. Glenn Standard
Discounts ERISA Fiduciaries’ Conflicts of Interest, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 955, 960 (“Ultimately,
pronouncement of the Firestone standard of review resulted in the amendment of virtually all
ERISA plans to confer discretion on fiduciaries to construe or interpret the terms of their
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functional terms, the Firestone approach thus establishes a
paradigmatic legal-information-forcing rule.
Other ERISA rules reveal a similar pattern. In some circuits at
least, a default rule restricts a plan sponsor’s right to make
unilateral changes to the terms of the plan.104 However, plans
routinely include express language permitting amendment or
termination of the plan.105 The default rule thus has no practical
effect other than inducing plan sponsors to provide information
about the legal rule governing plan modifications.
At a more pedestrian level, lower court cases interpreting ERISA’s
requirement of a summary plan description (SPD) impose several
contradictory standards that are curiously unified by their confident
reliance on the informative value of express contract terms. Cases
falling at one end of the spectrum require employers to include in
the SPD extremely specific legal facts concerning the circumstances
that might lead to a benefit denial.106 Employers who fail to provide
this legal information risk having to pay participants benefits to
which they would not be entitled under the terms of the formal plan.
In contrast, other cases give employers much wider latitude to omit
information from the SPD so long as the SPD includes an express
disclaimer directing beneficiaries to consult the formal plan
plans. By so doing, employers secured for themselves under the Firestone standard the
substantial benefit of receiving deferential rather than de novo review when plan members
challenged benefit denials.” (citation omitted)); John H. Langbein, Trust as Regulatory Law:
The UNUM/Provident Scandal and Judicial Review of Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 101
NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1324 (2007) (“ERISA plans are virtually always professionally drafted
instruments, the work of specialist counsel or plan administration firms. Plan drafters
routinely seize upon Bruch's invitation to instruct the courts to defer to plan decisionmaking.
In consequence, deferential review pervades the ERISA-plan world, despite the primary
holding in Bruch that purports to establish the opposite.” (citation omitted)); Paul M.
Secunda, Cultural Cognition Insights into Judicial Decisionmaking in Employee Benefits
Cases, 3 AM. U. LAB. & EMP. L.F. 1, 13 n.73 (2013) (“Unsurprisingly, the Firestone decision has
led most employers to design plans with language investing its plan administrators with the
necessary discretionary authority in order to take advantage of the more favorable review
standard.” (citing COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW: POLICY
AND PRACTICE 532 (3d ed. 2011))).
104. See, e.g., Rossetto v. Pabst Brewing Co., 217 F.3d 539, 543-44 (7th Cir. 2000).
105. See, e.g., Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1998) (en banc)
(enforcing plan sponsor’s express right to modify contained in the formal plan despite
seemingly contradictory language in many plan summaries).
106. See, e.g., Ruotolo v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 622 F. Supp. 546, 549 (D. Conn. 1985);
Zittrouer v. Uarco Inc. Grp. Benefit Plan, 582 F. Supp. 1471, 1474 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
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documents to determine their rights and obligations.107 Under both
approaches, the default rule formally favors employees but seems
designed solely to induce employers to include certain legal
information in their SPD. As with the Firestone rule, the universal
practice of plan sponsors is to opt out of the default by providing the
required information.
3. Other Disclaimers, Waivers, and Limitations of Liability
Legal-information-forcing rules are equally common outside of the
employment context. We have already seen how the Hadley rule
“forces” carriers and other commercial parties to include liability
limitations in their contracts.108 Many other providers of products
and services employ a similar strategy of disclaimer and liability
limitation. Recall, for example, your last skydiving or hang-gliding
lesson. Or think about the documents you signed before participat-
ing in a whitewater rafting adventure or when you registered your
child to play youth soccer, lacrosse, or football. In each of these
cases, the activity sponsor faces potential tort liability for any negli-
gently caused injuries to participants. However, courts routinely
give effect to prospective waivers of liability for ordinary
negligence.109 The barrage of exculpatory clauses that greet
participants in these activities is the predictable consequence of
these rules. The ubiquity and enforceability of these waivers
transforms at least part of the ostensibly mandatory tort rule into
a legal-information-forcing default.
107. See, e.g., Kolentus v. Avco Corp., 798 F.2d 949, 958 (7th Cir. 1986).
108. See supra Part I.C.
109. A few states refuse to enforce prospective waivers of negligence liability. See, e.g.,
Hiett v. Lake Barcroft Cmty. Ass’n, 418 S.E.2d 894, 897 (Va. 1992) (relying on the court’s prior
decision in Johnson’s Adm’x v. Richmond & Danville R.R., 11 S.E. 829 (Va. 1890)). In many
jurisdictions, however, prospective waivers ordinarily protect against liability for negligence
but remain ineffective against claims based on reckless or intentional conduct. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 (1981) (“(1) A term exempting a party from tort
liability for harm caused intentionally or recklessly is unenforceable on grounds of public
policy. (2) A term exempting a party from tort liability for harm caused negligently is
unenforceable on grounds of public policy [in several narrowly defined circumstances].”). But
see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 (2000) (suggesting that prospective waivers may also
be enforceable for claims based on a defendant’s reckless or intentional conduct).
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Similarly, the Uniform Commercial Code contemplates—and
product manufacturers routinely invoke—an express formula for
disclaiming the Code’s default warranty of merchantability and
limiting consequential damages.110 Credit card agreements always
include a variety of exculpatory clauses designed to protect the
credit card issuer from liability for refusing to authorize a particular
credit transaction.111 Contracts for services such as car rental
agreements contain a host of clauses that place responsibility for
certain losses on the rental customer and excuse the rental company
from liability.112 Computer software end-user license agreements
(EULAs) uniformly include comprehensive disclaimers of virtually
every form of liability that might be imposed on the software
publisher and strictly limit the purchaser to the remedy of replacing
defective disks.113 Software downloaded from the Web similarly
requires prior consent to a “click-wrap” license that contains a
familiar litany of exculpatory clauses.114 Finally, online communities
110. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2012) (“[T]o exclude or modify the implied warranty of
merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of
a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the
exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous.”). Revised Article 2 carries forward a similar,
though even more specific formula: “[T]o exclude or modify the implied warranty of
merchantability or any part of it in a consumer contract the language must be in a record, be
conspicuous, and state ‘The seller undertakes no responsibility for the quality of the goods
except as otherwise provided in this contract,’ and in any other contract the language must
mention merchantability and in case of a record must be conspicuous.” U.C.C. § 2-316(2)
(Proposed Official Draft 2003). Similarly, U.C.C. § 2-719(3) provides that: “Consequential
damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable.”
111. See, e.g., Capital One Customer Agreement, CAP. ONE FIN. CO. 3 (July 16, 2013),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/a/assets/credit-card-agreements/pdf/creditcardagreement_
8794.pdf [http://perma.cc/3LUJ-L3P6] (“We are not responsible if anyone refuses to accept
your Card for any reason. Also, we may reject any transaction for any reason.”).
112. See, e.g., Dollar Rent A Car General Policies, DOLLAR RENT A CAR (Feb. 9. 2012),
http://www.dollar.com/AboutUs/GeneralPolicies.aspx [http://perma.cc/3BP4-JZXE] (last visit-
ed Feb. 3, 2015) (excluding liability and offering optional insurance coverage).
113. See, e.g., Adobe End-User License Agreement, ADOBE SYS. INC., https://www.adobe.com/
support/downloads/license.html [http://perma.cc/EB9N-LR25] (last visited Feb. 3, 2015)
(“Limit of Liability: In no event will Adobe be liable to you for any loss of use, interruption of
business, or any direct, indirect, special, incidental, or consequential damages of any kind
(including lost profits) regardless of the form of action whether in contract, tort (including
negligence), strict product liability or otherwise, even if Adobe has been advised of the
possibility of such damages.”).
114. See, e.g., Software License Agreement for iTunes, APPLE INC. 4-5 (Sept. 10, 2013),
http://images.apple.com/legal/sla/docs/iTunesForWindows.pdf [http://perma.cc/8FVN-VKCM]
(last visited Feb. 3, 2015). For unusually insightful empirically based analysis of click-wrap
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and web-based services demand that participants agree to an
exhaustive list of liability limitations and service restrictions.115
The common thread that runs through all of these examples is
that sophisticated contracting parties respond to legal rules favoring
their contractual partners by adopting express terms that shift the
balance of legal rights in their own favor. Traditional majoritarian
default rule analysis would criticize these doctrines for generating
unnecessary transaction costs.116 On this view, the rules cause
wasteful efforts to draft disclaimers, liability limitations, and other
exculpatory clauses that appear in virtually every contract.117 The
theory of legal-information-forcing defaults provides an alternative,
potentially more constructive role for these doctrines.118 According
to this perspective, the routine practice of contracting around such
rules conveys valuable legal information to comparatively unsophis-
ticated parties.119 It remains to be seen, however, whether express
contract terms successfully dispel our widespread legal ignorance.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH A LEGAL-INFORMATION-FORCING
JUSTIFICATION
In this Part, I identify a significant practical problem with legal-
information-forcing rules. As a result, legal ignorance persists even
in the face of fully informative express contract terms.120 Scholars,
and to a lesser extent judges, have sometimes considered this
problem, but their analysis does little to clarify the appropriate
licenses and EULAs, see Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Are “Pay Now, Terms Later” Contracts
Worse for Buyers? Evidence from Software License Agreements, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 309, 311
(2009); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard Form Contracts:
The Case of Software License Agreements, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 449-50 (2008);
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, What's in a Standard Form Contract? An Empirical Analysis of
Software License Agreements, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 677, 678-79 (2007). A recent book
by Nancy Kim has also focused critical attention on click-wrap and browse-wrap license
agreements. KIM, supra note 19.
115. See Facebook Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, http://www.
facebook.com/terms.php [http://perma.cc/3Z65-JMCH] (last visited Jan. 25, 2015) (containing
a comprehensive disclaimer in § 63).
116. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 52, at 1592.
117. Id.
118. See supra Part I.A.
119. Id.
120. See supra notes 2, 56.
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scope or design of these default rules.121 One possible response to the
shortcomings of legal-information-forcing defaults would be to
develop more effective ways to convey legal information to unsophis-
ticated parties. I argue, however, that we currently lack essential
empirical facts about how people obtain and process legal informa-
tion. Moreover, many parties are rationally ignorant about contract
terms and efforts to make them fully informed would be socially
wasteful.
A. The Persistence of Legal Ignorance
As the previous Part demonstrated, contract documents that we
encounter in our everyday lives as consumers and employees
include an extraordinary quantity of legal information. In light of
the ubiquity of express contract terms, it is nothing short of
remarkable how little we seem to know about the law governing our
diverse transactions.122 But a moment’s reflection reveals a straight-
forward explanation for this divergence between the quantity of
information provided and the level of legal understanding achieved.
A major premise underlying the argument for legal-information-
forcing rules is almost certainly false. To put the matter most
simply: people quite often ignore the text of written contracts.
Almost no one reads contracts carefully enough to digest the legal
information that these default rules are designed to force.123 Indeed,
the ostensible audience for this legal information—consumers,
employees, and other comparatively unsophisticated parties—is the
least likely to invest sufficient time and attention to benefit from
the newly available contractual terms. Thus, if the purpose of these
default rules is to convey legal information to all, or even many,
unsophisticated parties, the default rules likely frustrate that
objective.
In response to this problem, courts have developed some doctrinal
requirements designed to ensure that parties understand their
contractual undertakings.124 Commentators and legislators have
121. See infra Part II.B.1.
122. See supra notes 2, 56.
123. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 3, at 651; Bakos et al., supra note 19, at 4.
124. See infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
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focused their attention on mandatory disclosure regulations.125 The
next Section discusses these efforts and explains how they differ
from and relate to legal-information-forcing default rules.
B. Judicial and Scholarly Perspectives on Legal Ignorance
Several strands of the scholarly literature bear some relation to
the problems we have been considering. 
1. Disclosure Requirements
First, a substantial body of work explores the potential benefits
of imposing legal disclosure requirements in various transactional
settings. For example, federal law requires lenders to disclose
repayment terms and annual percentage rates in a standardized
format.126 Similarly, food and drug law requires product labels to
include ingredient lists and nutritional information.127 And federal
securities law mandates that issuers publish a comprehensive pro-
spectus describing any new offering in excruciating detail.128
Considerable effort has gone into evaluating the success or failure
of particular disclosure obligations. An early article by William
Whitford, for example, reviewed studies of how truth-in-lending
laws affect consumer knowledge of credit terms.129 More recently,
commentators have argued that excessive disclosure requirements
create a danger of information overload.130 Still other work relies on
experimental studies of consumer behavior to challenge the
information-overload hypothesis.131 These papers show that con-
sumer search strategies readily adapt to the presence of too much
125. See infra notes 126-37 and accompanying text.
126. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2012) (Truth in Lending statements required by FTC Act).
127. See 21 C.F.R. § 101.1 (2014) (FDA disclosure regulations).
128. See 12 C.F.R. § 16.3 (2014) (SEC disclosure regulations).
129. See generally William C. Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in
Consumer Transactions, 1973 WIS. L. REV. 400.
130. See Naresh K. Malhotra, Information Load and Consumer Decision Making, 8 J.
CONSUMER RES. 419 (1982); Naresh K. Malhotra, Reflections on the Information Overload
Paradigm in Consumer Decision Making, 10 J. CONSUMER RES. 436, 437 (1984).
131. David M. Grether et al., The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of
Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 279-80 (1986).
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information by simply ignoring the excess.132 As a result, excessive
disclosure may well be worthless, but it does not cause consumers
to make poor choices as a result of an “overload” of information.133
In a recent book, Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider expand
their prior critique of mandatory disclosure regulations.134 They
argue that most people have little taste for reading mandated
disclosures.135 Consumers ignore the flood of information contained
in boilerplate terms and instead make decisions on the basis of
simpler rules of thumb. Ben-Shahar and Schneider observe that
disclosure regulations particularly appeal to legislators because, as
compared to more intrusive substantive rules specifying permissible
contract terms, mere disclosure requirements appear to impose far
less intrusive obligations on businesses.136 Moreover, designing
mandatory rules for consumer transactions requires much more
empirical information and necessarily runs the risk of causing
unintended effects on the supply of goods and services. They
conclude that the current regulatory strategy produces far more
harm than good.137 In their view, the current disclosure regime
should be abandoned and replaced with more direct consumer
protection measures when sufficient evidence warrants interven-
tion.138
The disclosure literature undoubtedly sheds light on consumers’
information-processing techniques. Skeptical scholarly assessments
of mandatory disclosure regulations also tend to confirm our conjec-
ture that unsophisticated parties derive little or no benefit from the
boilerplate language that legal-information-forcing rules inspire.139
However, disclosure regulations and legal-information-forcing
defaults differ in important respects. The sanction for violating dis-
closure rules is typically a civil or criminal penalty of some kind.140
In contrast, a party who fails to provide the information targeted by
132. Id. at 284-85.
133. Id. at 301.
134. BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 3, at 3-4.
135. Id. at 10-11.
136. Id. at 5-6.
137. Id. at 12.
138. Id. at 12-13.
139. Id. at 8-11.
140. See Whitford, supra note 129, at 432-33.
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an information-forcing default must carry out the transaction under
an unfavorable legal rule. The most appropriate remedy for
excessive disclosure regulations is simply to eliminate the unproduc-
tive legal requirements. Fixing a malfunctioning legal-information-
forcing default, in contrast, requires a lawmaker to determine an
appropriate legal rule to govern the transaction in question.
Moreover, disclosure regulations typically specify with great
precision what information parties must disclose, and how they
must make these required disclosures. Information-forcing defaults
are ordinarily cast in more general terms and leave the details of
contract drafting to the discretion of the disclosing party.141 This
lack of standardization significantly complicates the task of
evaluating the effectiveness of a legal-information-forcing default
rule.
2. Boilerplate and Contracts of Adhesion
One salient fact about legal-information-forcing rules is that the
targeted information is most often communicated in a standardized
form contract, such as a bill of sale, an employee handbook, a
standard form insurance contract, a release of liability, or a rental
agreement.142 Another important strand of contracts scholarship
examines the problems associated with enforcing such standard
form agreements, which are typically offered on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis. Often referred to as contracts of adhesion, these form
contracts have been the subject of frequent academic criticism.143 
In a widely discussed recent book, Margaret Jane Radin has
launched a wide-ranging critique of contemporary consumer con-
tract practices.144 She documents the ubiquity of fine-print terms in
141. For examples of employment contract disclaimers and confirmations of at-will status,
see supra notes 84-85.
142. RADIN, supra note 19, at 9-11.
143. See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom
of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632-33 (1943); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An
Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1174, 1175-76 (1983).
144. RADIN, supra note 19, at 16-18. For commentary on the book, see Omri Ben-Shahar,
Regulation Through Boilerplate: An Apologia, 112 MICH. L. REV. 883 (2014) (reviewing RADIN,
supra note 19), to which Radin has responded. Margaret Jane Radin, What Boilerplate Said:
A Response to Omri Ben-Shahar (and a Diagnosis) (Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law Research Paper
Series, Paper No. 392, Univ. Mich. Law & Economics Research Paper Series, Paper No. 14-
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consumer transactions that limit liability, restrict remedies, and
impose mandatory arbitration. Focusing first on the question of
consent, Radin rejects arguments that consumers impliedly agree
to these terms.145 Mere awareness that such terms are likely to be
a part of any transaction cannot substitute for the manifestation of
mutual assent at the core of traditional contract doctrine. Nor is it
sufficient to argue that boilerplate terms economize on transaction
costs or promote efficient risk allocations. Radin indicts lawmakers
for their inattention to these problems and contends the routine
enforcement of boilerplate ultimately undermines the rule of law.146
She proposes various regulatory measures to control these private
efforts to supplant legal obligations. Courts should scrutinize these
“rights deletions” closely and, she contends, refuse to enforce terms
that interfere with important public values.147 Indeed, Radin sug-
gests that the most egregious efforts to impose one-sided terms
through boilerplate should subject the drafters to potential tort
liability.148
In contrast, many legal economists have defended contemporary
contract practices. According to this competing account, legal
ignorance is widespread, but economic efficiency compels mass-
market sellers and service providers to develop standardized terms
and rely on streamlined methods of obtaining consumer consent to
those terms.149 Individual negotiations with consumers are infeasi-
ble and would be wasteful. Instead, we can rely on competitive
pressure and a small minority of comparison shoppers to police
contract terms.150 An unusually nuanced version of this efficiency
argument proposes that business firms use standard-form contracts
007, Feb. 2014), available at http://perma.cc/WRZ9-Z7PP. And for a rich selection of scholarly
perspectives on the broader topic of boilerplate terms, see Omri Ben-Shahar, Foreword, 104
MICH. L. REV. 821 (2006).
145. RADIN, supra note 19, at 13-14.
146. Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate: A Threat to the Rule of Law?, in PRIVATE LAW AND
THE RULE OF LAW (Lisa M. Austin & Dennis Klimchuk eds., 2014).
147. RADIN, supra note 19, at 246-47.
148. Id. For another recent critique of modern consumer contract practice, see KIM, supra
note 19.
149. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive
Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 827-28 (2006); Jason Scott Johnston, The Return
of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative
Negotiation Between Businesses and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857, 858 (2006).
150. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 6, at 638.
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to establish a restrictive baseline from which they allow their
managerial agents to negotiate discretionary exceptions granting
benefits to which consumers are not legally entitled.151
Judicial reaction to contracts of adhesion has been, for the most
part, accepting and accommodating. Although judges express
occasional misgivings about enforcing form contracts, courts have
largely ignored the most extreme academic critics who would, for
example, create a presumption against enforceability.152 Instead,
prevailing law enforces unfavorable form contract terms against
unsophisticated parties so long as they meet minimal standards of
procedural fairness.153 Judges appear to assume that adhering
parties are either adequately informed about the terms of their
agreement or that a competitive market provides sufficient protec-
tion against fundamentally unfair agreements.154 On those few
occasions that courts refuse enforcement, they almost invariably
find that a particular clause is both substantively oppressive and
that the process of agreement was flawed in some way.155
No such problems afflict the express terms that are the subject of
this Article. Although the terms with which we are concerned
almost always appear in form contracts, few if any of them are even
arguably unconscionable. Indeed, numerous judicial decisions ex-
pressly invite employers or other sophisticated parties to include
specific contract language in order to avoid the unfavorable
consequences of the legal-information-forcing default rule.156 It
would be utterly incongruous to invite parties to contract around an
information-forcing default rule and then hold that the invited
terms were unconscionable. Moreover, courts have shown little
151. See Johnston, supra note 149, at 858.
152. See Rakoff, supra note 19, at 1195.
153. See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (enforcing a
contract to arbitrate, but discussing minimal standards of procedural fairness); Hill v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997) (relying on an efficiency analysis to
enforce an arbitration clause contained in a buy-now-terms-later purchase contract).
154. See, e.g., Hunter v. Tex. Instruments, 798 F.2d 299, 302-03 (8th Cir. 1986); RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 116 (7th ed. 2007) (“[I]f one seller offers unattractive
terms ... a competing seller, wanting sales for himself, [will] offer more attractive terms, the
process continuing until the terms are optimal.”).
155. See, e.g., Fitz v. NCR Corp., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88, 95 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (finding an
express arbitration agreement in an employment contract void under California’s
unconscionability doctrine).
156. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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sympathy for litigants who claim not to have read or understood
provisions of the legal documents they have signed.157 The “duty to
read” doctrine creates a virtually irrebuttable presumption that a
person is fully aware of the contents of any writing that he or she
has signed.158 With the exception of cases involving potential fraud
or misrepresentation, courts thus stand ready to enforce the express
contract terms that legal-information-forcing rules cause sophisti-
cated parties to include in their agreements.
3. Academic Support for Legal-Information-Forcing Rules
Indeed, recent academic commentary lauds the potential utility
of legal-information-forcing default rules. My own prior work on
employment contract practices first suggested a legal-information-
forcing rationale for rules that liberally construe informal assur-
ances of job security against employers.159 Richard Craswell dis-
cussed a similar argument in the context of consumer contracting.160
Cynthia Estlund has proposed a strong default rule of just cause to
ensure that firms will clearly inform their workers about the terms
governing discharge.161 And Cass Sunstein has embraced the legal-
information-forcing theory as a general argument for switching
default rules to favor employees.162
One common characteristic of all existing legal-information-
forcing arguments is that they rely on an assumption that the
targeted information will be received and understood.163 Despite the
157. See, e.g., Williams v. Windermere Real Estate/East, Inc., 138 Wash. App. 1014 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2007) (unpublished opinion) (“[Plaintiff] is charged with knowledge of the contents
of documents she signs. Parties have a duty to read the contracts they sign.”); Eder v. Lake
Geneva Raceway, Inc., 523 N.W.2d 429, 431 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (“The failure to read a
contract does not by itself affect the contract’s validity.”).
158. For a typical application of this doctrine, see Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d
453 (6th Cir. 1986).
159. See Verkerke, supra note 14, at 874.
160. Richard Craswell, Benjamin E. Hermalin & Avery W. Katz, Contract Law, in
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 87-88 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
161. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees, supra note 20, at 7-8.
162. Sunstein, Human Behavior, supra note 22, at 206; Sunstein, Switching the Default
Rule, supra note 22, at 110.
163. See, e.g., Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1264 (N.J. 1985)
modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985). See generally Verkerke, supra note 14; Verkerke, supra
note 8, at 64-65.
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myriad legal-information-forcing default rules currently in effect,
however, legal ignorance persists. Existing doctrines cause contracts
to include copious quantities of legal information. But neither courts
nor commentators appear to have given much thought to the ques-
tion of whether these express terms serve their ostensible purpose
of informing parties about the legal rules governing the transaction. 
One possible response to the persistence of legal ignorance would
be to improve the quality of existing legal disclosures. Lawmakers
might try to design information-forcing rules that induce sophisti-
cated parties to provide legal information in a manner that is more
likely to be read and understood. The next section reviews the
surprisingly sparse research available on this issue and speculates
about the feasibility of perfecting the informative function of
information-forcing rules.
C. Designing Effective Express Contract Terms
In light of the prevalence of legal-information-forcing default
rules, one would expect to find substantial research investigating
how to make those rules most effective. In fact, only a few scholars
have produced work that bears directly on this issue.
A worldwide movement to promote the use of plain language in
public and private documents explicitly aims to make these legal
materials more readable and understandable to a layperson.
Beginning in the 1970s, some leading U.S. financial institutions
voluntarily rewrote their loan agreements and other consumer
contracts.164 State legislation followed and currently imposes plain
language requirements for consumer contracts in a number of
jurisdictions.165 I am unaware, however, of any evidence showing
that these otherwise admirable efforts have increased consumers’
willingness to read the complex contracts they sign. Indeed, the
apparent futility of even more intrusive and demanding disclosure
regulations suggests that most consumers see no compelling reason
164. See Debra R. Cohen, Competent Legal Writing—A Lawyer’s Professional
Responsibility, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 491, 500-01 (1999).
165. See supra note 21. 
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to spend the time required to read and understand these
documents.166
In the more specific context of employment contracting, Pauline
Kim has found that workers significantly overestimate the extent
of their legal protection against unjust discharge.167 Her study also
investigated whether commonly used confirmations of at-will status
would ameliorate this biased assessment of prevailing law. Her
principal finding on this question was that these contractual dis-
claimers had no measurable effect on respondents’ assessment of
hypothetical discharge scenarios.168 They continued to express
overly optimistic beliefs about the law governing employment
termination. As Kim acknowledged, her survey respondents may
have failed to distinguish between informal workplace norms and
legally enforceable obligations.169 And the survey design involved
asking subjects about specific termination scenarios before introduc-
ing the at-will language and then asking the same subjects about
the same scenarios.170 Thus, a conditioning effect could explain why
subjects offered the same responses in the treatment condition. A
better experimental design would separate treatment and control
groups to determine the effect of at-will language on subjects’ beliefs
about job security. Nevertheless, Kim’s study provides at least
suggestive evidence that individuals’ beliefs about job security may
be unchanged by commonly used employment contract practices.
More recent work by Jesse Rudy improved on Kim’s study by
surveying employed individuals rather than those who had recently
lost their jobs.171 Rudy confirmed Kim’s findings about workers’
tendency to overestimate the legal protections against discharge
166. See BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 3; Bakos et al., supra note 19.
167. Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions
of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 133 (1997).
168. Id. at 139-40.
169. For further discussion of just-cause norms in the workplace, see Pauline Kim, Norms,
Learning and Law: Exploring the Influences on Workers’ Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV.
447; Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms and the Employment
Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913, 1916-17 (1996).
170. Kim, supra note 167, at 110.
171. Jesse Rudy, What They Don’t Know Won’t Hurt Them: Defending Employment-At-Will
in Light of Findings that Employees Believe They Possess Just Cause Protection, 23 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 307, 311 (2002).
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that they enjoy.172 Because he chose to administer a survey instru-
ment identical to the one Kim employed, however, his replication of
her results showing the ineffectiveness of at-will language is subject
to the same methodological criticism. Despite these reservations,
the results of these studies remain the most direct demonstration
that legal-information-forcing rules concerning employment termin-
ation may fail to inform workers about the law.
What then might explain why workers would remain oblivious to
their legal status despite prominent contractual language that, at
least nominally, informs them of their rights? In this context at
least, there are strong reasons to believe that workers are rationally
ignorant about the legal terms governing employment termina-
tion.173 Viewed at the time of contracting, practical obstacles that
stand in the way of vindicating a worker’s contractual right against
unjust termination diminish the value of that right. For example,
many discharged workers will be unable to obtain legal counsel, or
afford the cost of legal representation. This lack of representation
will likely deter them from challenging their termination. Moreover,
evidence to rebut an employer’s asserted reason for discharge may
often be unavailable. Faced with the prospect of spending several
unpleasant years embroiled in litigation with an uncertain outcome,
many terminated workers will choose instead to focus on finding a
new job.
Other sources of both legal and extra-legal protection against
unjust termination further diminish the marginal value of contrac-
tual rights. Employment discrimination statutes, whistleblowing
laws, the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, and
a wide variety of anti-retaliation provisions in state and federal
statutes offer considerable non-waivable legal protection against
being discharged for a bad reason. Most workers also enjoy some
extra-legal assurance against unjust termination because an infor-
mal just-cause norm prevails in the majority of U.S. workplaces.174
In short, workers may rationally conclude that the cost of becoming
172. Id.
173. Rudy, supra note 171, at 359; J.H. Verkerke, Employment Contract Law, in THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 47, 52 (1998).
174. See Rock & Wachter, supra note 169, at 1917.
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better informed about contractual terms governing discharge
exceeds any expected benefit that such knowledge could confer. 
One potential solution to the problem of rational ignorance about
contract terms would be to target legal-information-forcing efforts
on specific terms that unsophisticated parties would benefit from
knowing. In a recently published article, Ian Ayres and Alan
Schwartz describe a novel solution to the “no-reading problem” that
afflicts consumer contracting.175 Their approach begins with the
familiar empirical observation that consumers have little interest
in reading the standard form contracts they sign.176 The venerable
duty-to-read doctrine therefore rests on a counterfactual presump-
tion about consumer behavior. Ayres and Schwartz observe,
however, that consumers need not read to learn about prevailing
contract terms. Instead, they form expectations about terms based
on what they learn from store visits, read in the media, experience
in their own transactions, and hear from friends.177 These beliefs
may accurately correspond to the content of a particular contract. Or
consumers may suffer from “term optimism,” a mistaken belief that
a contract’s terms are more favorable than the provisions actually
included in its text.178
Ayres and Schwartz propose an elaborate contracting regime
designed to combat term optimism. Their system would induce
mass-market sellers to survey consumers periodically to determine
if those consumers correctly understood the terms of the sellers’
agreements, a process they call “term substantiation.”179 Sellers
then would be required to use a standardized warning box to
disclose any terms that consumers mistakenly thought were more
favorable.180 In addition, sellers would have to conduct follow-up
surveys to demonstrate that these warnings were effective.181
This proposal wisely recognizes that consumers have multiple
sources of information about contract terms. The system of term
175. Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66
STAN. L. REV. 545 (2014).
176. See id. at 545.
177. See id. at 550-51.
178. See id. at 551-52.
179. Id. at 552-53.
180. See id. at 553.
181. See id. at 584.
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substantiation and standardized warnings also cleverly limits
disclosure efforts in an effort to make them more effective. The
standardized warning box would include only those terms about
which consumers are overly optimistic, and would exclude any
terms a majority of consumers regard as insignificant. As Ayres and
Schwartz demonstrate, sellers already have an adequate incentive
to correct consumers’ mistakenly pessimistic beliefs about contract
terms.182 Moreover, they speculate that typographic standardization
and careful targeting of the information in the warning box will
encourage consumers to pay attention.183
Although this creative attempt to make contract terms truly
informative is admirable, its prospects for adoption seem remote at
best.184 Perhaps there exists no feasible method of communicating
contract terms that would inform unsophisticated parties about the
legal rules governing their transactions. If this speculation is
correct, we must entertain the possibility that for some legal rules
the broad information-forcing objective is futile. Lawmakers have
tried to design legal requirements for contracting out of these rules
that will allow the majority of unsophisticated parties to receive and
process the relevant information.185 Despite these efforts, parties in
many contractual settings appear to be impervious to the readily
available legal information.186 Existing studies of employment
contracting hint that this may be true for terms governing dis-
charge.187 We should expect similar problems to arise in other
legally complex areas such as ERISA benefits, warranty disclaimers,
damage limitations, and insurance contracts.
182. See id. at 554.
183. See id. at 553.
184. For a similarly creative proposal focused on insurance contracts, see Michelle
Boardman, Insuring Understanding: The Tested Language Defense, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1075,
1077 (2010).
185. See Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 175, at 549-50.
186. See id. at 550-51.
187. See Kim, supra note 167, at 106; Rudy, supra note 171, at 310-11.
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III. ALTERNATIVE RATIONALES FOR CLAUSE-FORCING DEFAULT
RULES
We have seen that legal-information-forcing rules probably fail to
inform the majority of unsophisticated people about the legal rules
governing their transactions. Accordingly, it is important to explore
potential alternative purposes that such rules might serve. I will
use the term “clause-forcing” default rule to distinguish these candi-
date theories from the conventional legal-information-forcing story.
This Part examines four possibilities. First, a growing body of
scholarship, inspired by behavioral economic theories and cognitive
psychology, argues that lawmakers should use default rules to
“nudge” market participants towards more efficient or socially
desirable choices.188 Second, the express terms that result from
clause-forcing defaults may improve the accessibility of legal
information for a distinct subset of legally unsophisticated parties,
such as avid comparison shoppers; or those terms could aid
reviewers and consumer advocates who seek to inform and protect
unsophisticated individuals. Third, a clause-forcing default could
facilitate ex post dispute resolution by ensuring that the contract
contains a clear statement of the legal rules governing each trans-
action. Finally, we might understand exculpatory contract language
as an effort to opt out of the comparatively expensive legal system
in favor of an alternative regime of rights and obligations enforced
solely by informal social norms. On this account, judicial scrutiny of
the resulting contractual provisions polices the line between law-
governed and norm-governed relationships. This Section describes
and critiques each of these potential justifications.
A. “Nudging” Parties to Make Better Choices
In recent decades, scholars have developed experimental evidence
that default rules can be “sticky” in the sense that cognitive and
behavioral limitations may prevent individuals from opting out of
188. See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 5; Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H.
Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003).
2015] LEGAL IGNORANCE AND INFORMATION-FORCING RULES 945
the default.189 An approach dubbed “libertarian paternalism”
proposes to use the stickiness of default rules to pursue policy
objectives.190 Leading proponents such as Richard Thaler and Cass
Sunstein have celebrated the success of this approach in increasing
enrollment rates for employer-provided retirement savings plans.191
The simple expedient of making automatic enrollment the default,
rather than requiring employees to opt in, has dramatically
increased the proportion of new hires who participate in these
plans.192 Similar efforts are proposed or underway to alter defaults
affecting banking rules, credit card terms, home mortgage escrows,
health insurance, employment termination, and privacy policies.193 
Perhaps the clause-forcing rules I have identified can be defended
as efforts to nudge unsophisticated parties to choose more favorable
contract terms. I doubt, however, that such a justification can
withstand close scrutiny. First, the libertarian paternalist project
relies on the premise that once lawmakers have chosen their
preferred default, the rule will “stick” and therefore alter the
preexisting, and undesirable, market equilibrium.194 In contrast,
clause-forcing rules are, by definition, defaults that provoke opt-
outs. Just like the libertarian paternalist nudge, clause-forcing rules
favor unsophisticated parties. But rather than changing prevailing
terms, a clause-forcing rule simply causes sophisticated parties to
include contractual language opting out of the default. 
As Lauren Willis has perceptively argued, default rules often
become “slippery,” rather than sticky, when one party opposes the
default strongly enough to incur the costs of encouraging opt-outs.195
Indeed, sophisticated parties will tend to oppose defaults more
strongly when lawmakers use them to achieve more significant
policy objectives.196 The higher the economic stakes involved, the
greater the investment those parties will make to ensure that
189. See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 8.
190. See id. at 4-6.
191. See id. at 11-13.
192. See id. at 114-15.
193. See Estlund, Just the Facts, supra note 20, at 363-64; Willis, supra note 22, at 1159
& nn.14-17; see also Sunstein, Human Behavior, supra note 22, at 221.
194. See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 8.
195. Willis, supra note 22, at 1200.
196. See id. at 1174.
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unsophisticated parties waive the favorable default.197 Of course,
lawmakers could respond by making it more difficult to contract
around the default and prohibiting practices that prime consumers
to opt out. But the task of making nudges “stick” is likely to require
regulation intrusive enough to be indistinguishable from the
substantive rules that libertarian paternalists sought to avoid.198
Clause-forcing defaults are, by definition, too slippery to fulfill the
goal of altering market equilibrium contract terms. Some default
rules—like the widely lauded automatic enrollment default for
retirement savings—may nudge parties to make better choices.199
Many others, perhaps even a majority of prevailing default rules,
produce nothing more (or less) than a nearly universal practice of
opting out.200 What then are we to make of the contractual boiler-
plate that these default rules inspire? The remaining Sections of
this Part explore potential functions that this exculpatory contract
language might serve.
B. Lowering Ex Ante Information Costs
The conventional understanding of legal-information-forcing rules
dictates that the resulting contract terms should inform all, or at
least most, unsophisticated parties about the targeted informa-
tion.201 We have seen, however, that few people read contracts
closely enough to dispel their legal ignorance.202 But what if some
individuals value legal information enough to justify reading more
carefully? If so, then a clause-forcing rule could sufficiently lower
this group’s information costs at the time of contracting to offset the
cost of drafting additional contract language.
In one version of this argument, consumers themselves vary in
the extent to which they value information about contract terms. We
might identify a subset of comparison shoppers who seek to learn
not only how well various tax preparation software programs
function, but also the legal details of the seller’s license agreement.
197. See id. at 1187-88.
198. Id. at 1211-26.
199. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 103-09.
200. See Willis, supra note 22, at 1159-60.
201. See, e.g., Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 175, at 545-46.
202. See, e.g., id. at 546.
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An often-cited article by Alan Schwartz and Louis Wilde argues that
competition among producers to serve these well-informed compari-
son shoppers provides benefits to all other consumers.203 Alterna-
tively, product reviewers and consumer advocates may gather and
disseminate information to consumers. These intermediaries theor-
etically lower information costs for consumers. They also potentially
magnify the competitive consequences of any differences in contract
terms by making those discrepancies more salient.
In either case, clause-forcing defaults ensure that critical infor-
mation about the legal rules governing each transaction is readily
accessible in the written documents for that transaction. On this
interpretation, the default rule facilitates comparison shopping and
enables product reviewers and consumer advocates. The activities
of comparison shoppers and information intermediaries in turn
promote allocative efficiency by scrutinizing the proffered terms and
exerting some pressure on employers, manufacturers, and service
providers to offer a more balanced and reasonable set of terms than
they might otherwise be inclined to draft.204
Although a clause-forcing rule can undoubtedly lower the ex ante
costs of acquiring information about prevailing contract terms, such
a rule can do nothing to guarantee that any consumers will find it
valuable to read the resulting contract language. Someone shopping
for tax preparation software only cares about the end user license
terms if they differ meaningfully among otherwise acceptable
choices available in the market. If the license for Intuit’s TurboTax
is indistinguishable from H&R Block’s offering, even a savvy
purchaser will focus instead on functional differences between the
two products. Similarly, standard form insurance contracts vary so
little among insurers that even avid comparison shoppers might
rationally focus their search exclusively on variable parameters
such as price and coverage limits. The uniformity of key employ-
ment contract terms also undermines any ex ante information cost
justification for a clause-forcing default in this context. Job appli-
cants who confront legally indistinguishable terms governing
discharge at every potential employer have no incentive to compare
variations in the wording of at-will disclaimers. Instead, they are
203. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 6, at 637-38.
204. See id. at 651-58.
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more likely to gather information about each firm’s reputation for
treating workers fairly and the company’s future economic pros-
pects.
The very nature of clause-forcing rules implies that lawmakers
expect the overwhelming majority of parties to opt out. Unless those
opt outs vary in practically significant ways, even avid comparison
shoppers and information intermediaries are unlikely to value the
legal information that the resulting express contract terms commu-
nicate. Although it is impossible to know how often clause-forcing
defaults produce diverse terms, the striking uniformity of contrac-
tual boilerplate in many markets suggests that the ex ante value of
those terms seldom justifies selecting such a default.
C. Ex Post Legal Clarity
In many contractual settings, it seems doubtful that clause-
forcing defaults generate valuable information at the time of
contracting. Alternatively, express terms may be desirable not
because they inform people about the prevailing legal rule ex ante,
but instead because they make the rules clear ex post. At least in
theory, greater legal clarity ex post reduces the cost and uncertainty
surrounding both settlement negotiations and adjudication. On this
account, clause-forcing rules provide no direct benefit for the
unsophisticated parties to whom the resulting express contract
terms are proffered. These parties benefit only indirectly because
greater clarity about their legal rights reduces expected litigation
costs. One can easily imagine that over-burdened courts would also
be sympathetic to contract practices that facilitate settlement or
summary disposition of potential legal disputes. Express terms
preclude some litigation entirely by specifying the parties’ legal
rights, or lack of legal rights, clearly and precisely.205 For cases that
find their way into the judicial system, those same express terms
give judges grounds to dismiss complaints or grant summary
judgment whenever the terms resolve the dispute.206
205. See, e.g., Charles L. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An
Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV.
261, 261-62 (1985).
206. See id. at 263.
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One bit of evidence lends support to this rationale. Clause-forcing
rules most often apply to repeated transactions such as employ-
ment, credit, or the mass-market sale of products and services. In
settings such as these, sophisticated parties can amortize over many
transactions the costs of developing a standardized agreement
containing the necessary express contract terms. Clause-forcing
rules are far less common for unique transactions of the same
underlying value. Single-shot transactions—such as private sales of
used cars or hiring casual employees for domestic work—rarely
warrant significant investments in express contracting. In these
situations, it makes economic sense to rely more heavily on court-
provided default terms. The greater judicial tendency to adopt
information-forcing rules for repeated transactions is thus broadly
consistent with the goal of clarifying the prevailing terms ex post.
A quest for ex post legal clarity is intuitively appealing, but
suffers from both theoretical and practical problems. Lawmakers
also could eliminate legal uncertainty by adopting a clear default
rule favoring the sophisticated party in these same transactions.
What then could explain a judicial preference for clause-forcing
rather than market-mimicking default rules? First, courts may not
know what terms sophisticated parties desire. Rules such as the
Hadley requirement of foreseeability and the implied contract
erosions of employment-at-will are remarkably fuzzy. Far from
being precise rules, they incorporate comparatively vague principles
that make the outcomes of specific cases uncertain. The clause-
forcing strategy requires mass-market sellers, employers, insurers,
and other sophisticated parties to express clearly and precisely their
contractual intent. Even if courts could confidently predict the
majoritarian contract terms, however, they might feel it would be
unseemly to adopt clear defaults that decisively favor sophisticated
parties. Instead, they state a comparatively vague default rule,207 or
one that favors unsophisticated parties. At the same time, they in-
vite sophisticated parties to opt out of the default, and then readily
enforce whatever express terms the sophisticated party chooses to
draft.208
207. See Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV.
847, 848 (2000).
208. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 205, at 298.
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Clause-forcing rules thus might be interpreted as a judicial
strategy to simplify adjudication without appearing to favor unduly
the more powerful party to a bargain. Nevertheless, courts often
seem to make contract interpretation more complicated and uncer-
tain than absolutely necessary.209 This apparent ambivalence about
enforcement suggests that additional social goals, such as substan-
tive or procedural fairness, qualify the objective of ex post legal
clarity. Moreover, an account of information-forcing rules ideally
should incorporate a plausible account of what motivates the
behavior of contracting parties. Focusing too much on judicial
objectives could distort our picture of the role that express terms
play in the relations between contracting parties. In the next
Section, I consider what these terms might signal about party
intent. I then reframe judicial scrutiny of those terms as a decision
about the permissible scope of private governance.
D. Opting for Norms Rather Than Law 
Clause-forcing rules inspire parties to draft a vast array of
exculpatory contractual boilerplate. These standardized terms
prospectively waive liability, narrowly define contractual duties,
disclaim warranties, and carefully circumscribe remedies for breach.
In addition, these provisions are remarkably uniform both within
specific industries and across diverse lines of business. Perhaps a
common objective animates such strikingly parallel responses to
otherwise distinctive contractual settings. Could drafting parties be
using these clauses to signal their desire to supplant the formal
legal system of contract enforcement and substitute instead a norm-
governed relationship?
The contract language itself abundantly demonstrates antipathy
towards formal legal enforcement. By definition, a desire to exclude,
limit, or curtail legal rights unifies the use of exculpatory clauses.
The more difficult question, however, is whether the constraint
of social norms is robust enough to provide adequate assurance of
contractual performance. Before endorsing a strategy of opting for
norms, lawmakers should surely demand evidence that a meaning-
209. See Scott, supra note 207, at 848.
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ful extralegal substitute for judicial enforcement of legal rights
exists.
A large literature has documented how informal norms structure
many important economic relationships. From ranchers and whalers
to diamond merchants, and from cotton dealers to construction
subcontractors, scholars have shown that parties often ignore legal
entitlements and rely instead on social norms to determine their
rights and obligations.210 Norm-based enforcement particularly
thrives in close-knit communities.211 Frequent social contact, ready
access to information, and opportunities for repeat business
facilitate both sanctions for misconduct and rewards for good
performance.212 However, strong norms also can arise in larger and
less tightly integrated communities.213 Most humans appear to have
a deeply ingrained commitment to reciprocal fairness, and that
psychological tendency can support cooperative equilibria even in
the absence of opportunities for repeat dealing.214 
Some combination of reputational concerns and reciprocal
fairness often allows informal norms to constrain otherwise power-
ful market actors who enjoy broad discretion under the law. Edward
Rock and Michael Wachter, for example, have argued that a norm
requiring just cause for discharge prevails in most U.S. workplaces
even though the prevailing employment-at-will default, and the
ubiquitous clauses confirming employees’ at-will status, preclude
most contract claims for unjust termination.215 Although no one
would describe the ties among worldwide users of Facebook as close-
knit, those users routinely appeal to widely shared norms when they
object to changes in the company’s privacy policies.216 In many other
210. ELLICKSON, supra note 1 (ranchers and whalers); Bernstein, Creating Cooperation,
supra note 25, at 1724-25 (cotton dealers); Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 25, at 115
(diamond merchants); Macaulay, supra note 25, at 55 (construction subcontractors); Richman,
supra note 25, at 383 (diamond merchants).
211. See, e.g., Richman, supra note 25, at 397-98.
212. See id.
213. See, e.g., Bernstein, Creating Cooperation, supra note 25, at 1725-26.
214. See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of
Reciprocity, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 159, 159 (2000).
215. Rock & Wachter, supra note 169, at 1917.
216. Brandon Bailey, Facebook Privacy Controls Changed, Social Network Adds and
Subtracts Features, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Dec. 12, 2012, 4:38 PM), http://www.mercury
news.com/ci_22177099/facebook-privacy-controls-changed-social-network-adds-and [http://
perma.cc/8CLM-7M2Q].
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settings, researchers have found that parties look to norms rather
than law to resolve disputes and guide their behavior.217
If social norms like these can sufficiently deter opportunistic
conduct, then lawmakers could be using clause-forcing rules as part
of a broader effort to define the boundary between law and norms.
In the domain of judicial enforcement, parties look to a third-party
arbiter to interpret their obligations, assess performance, and
impose remedies for breach. Informal norms ordinarily overlap and
coexist with these legal rights.218 When disputes arise, parties
undoubtedly bargain in the “shadow of the law,” but they also
appeal routinely to industry norms and shared notions of fairness.219
Laboratory experiments and observational studies have shown that
the balance between the constraining effect of norms and law varies
widely.220
Exculpatory boilerplate shifts this balance decisively away from
legally enforceable rights and towards informal means of enforce-
ment. It is less obvious, however, what role clause-forcing rules play
in this process. Nevertheless, an unfavorable default rule forces
sophisticated parties to confront the question of whether to
tolerate—or contract around—the resulting legal rights.221 The sys-
tem of clause-forcing rules thus places the onus of excluding
judicially enforceable rights on the more powerful and legally
sophisticated party to these transactions. On this account, the
resulting exculpatory clauses (1) confer discretion on the drafting
party to administer a norms-based claims settlement procedure, and
(2) express that party’s desire to exclude the comparatively costly
and less flexible legal system.222 In short, clause-forcing default
rules invite drafting parties to opt out of the legal system. In the
217. See supra note 210.
218. See, e.g., Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 25, at 124 (explaining the private
arbitration system used by the diamond industry).
219. See, e.g., id.
220. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 1 (discussing empirical studies of how disputes are
resolved using social norms in the absence of the law); Verkerke, supra note 14 (using
empirical data to examine the influence of social norms on trends in employment law).
221. See supra text accompanying notes 9-17.
222. For a related account of the role of boilerplate terms in consumer contracts, see
Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 149, at 828-31; and Johnston, supra note 149, at 860-64. For
suggestions that employment contracting involves a similar tradeoff between law and norms,
see Rudy, supra note 171; Verkerke, supra note 14; and Verkerke, supra note 8.
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place of legally enforceable rights, these parties offer their contrac-
tual partners a system of enforcement based on social norms.223 To
the extent that courts enforce the resulting exculpatory contract
language, they accept and even endorse this substitution of social
norms for legal rights.
As many critics of modern consumer contract practices have ob-
served, courts ordinarily enforce the exculpatory boilerplate that
clause-forcing rules provoke.224 Contract drafters ordinarily may
preclude consumers, workers, insurance purchasers, and other
similar parties from asserting a wide variety of default legal entitle-
ments.225 Within this broad domain, legal-information-forcing rules
ironically allow private parties to displace legal rights altogether
and substitute a system governed primarily by informal social
norms.
Unsurprisingly, however, judges sometimes refuse to cede their
authority to resolve disputes about contractual rights and to award
remedies for breach. Doctrines such as unconscionability, duress,
and misrepresentation allow courts to intervene selectively when
they become convinced that a drafting party has abused its power.
For example, U.C.C. § 2-719(3) provides that “[c]onsequential
damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or
exclusion is unconscionable.”226 The interpretive canon of contra
proferentem and the insurance law doctrine that protects an
insured’s “reasonable expectation” of coverage similarly constrain
a contract drafter’s ability to displace legal obligations.227
If clause-forcing rules principally invite drafting parties to signal
unequivocally their desire to “opt for norms,” then judicial decisions
enforcing—or refusing to enforce—these exculpatory terms define
the boundary between formal and informal enforcement. Somewhat
analogously, pre-dispute arbitration agreements allow drafting
parties to select an arbitral forum in lieu of a judicial forum, for
223. See supra note 210 (citing sources).
224. See RADIN, supra note 19, at 7-8. 
225. Rakoff, supra note 19, at 1177-79.
226. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (2012) (emphasis added).
227. Some commentators have identified the potentially information-forcing function of the
contra proferentem doctrine, see, for example, Ayres, supra note 31, at 596, but not the canon’s
role in policing the line between law and norms.
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dispute resolution.228 In theory at least, arbitration preserves
parties’ substantive legal rights.229 As compared to the explicitly
exculpatory clauses we have been considering, an agreement to
arbitrate determines only who will resolve a dispute, and not what
substantive legal rules will apply to that dispute. In principle,
arbitration reduces dispute resolution costs solely by employing
more streamlined and expeditious procedures, such as limited
discovery, sharply reduced motions practice, prompt evidentiary
hearings, simplified procedural rules, and strict limits on grounds
for appeal. However, the impulse underlying pre-dispute arbitration
clauses closely mirrors the goals that drafting parties pursue with
exculpatory contract terms.230 For this reason, judicial approaches
to arbitration agreements and academic commentary on those
decisions often parallel their treatment of exculpatory boilerplate.
Just as the issue of arbitration has provoked strongly divergent
views, identical controversies animate the debate about expressly
exculpatory contract clauses. Many scholars fear that boilerplate
threatens to eviscerate the normative foundations of contractual
obligation. According to these critics, consumers, workers, and
others who confront standardized contracts of adhesion cannot
meaningfully consent, and their passive role in these transactions
may even undermine our democratic order.231 Another group of
scholars offers a more sanguine assessment of contractual boiler-
plate. In their view, exculpatory terms economize on dispute
228. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991); Mitsubishi
Motors v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
229. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628 (“By agreeing to arbitrate ... a party does
not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in
an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”). More recent Supreme Court decisions have
focused more single-mindedly on the issue of party consent and on vindicating the pro-
arbitration policy of the Federal Arbitration Act. We can see the Court’s reasoning shift from
concern about effectively vindicating substantive rights to a consent-based theory of
enforcement in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010) (beginning
the shift from a forum-selection rationale for enforcing arbitration agreements to a consent-
based rationale), AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (emphasizing party
consent), and Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (rejecting the
“effective vindication” doctrine).
230. For a related discussion of how arbitration clauses might lower the costs of resolving
disputes over consumer transactions, see Johnston, supra note 149.
231. See, e.g., RADIN, supra note 19, at 7-8.
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resolution costs and ordinarily pose no significant threat to adhering
parties or to our social and political order.232 
It is far beyond the scope of this Article to arbitrate between these
competing perspectives on modern contract practices. Instead, I
have tried to illuminate how clause-forcing rules inspire drafters to
generate copious quantities of exculpatory boilerplate. Those rules
may exist not because the resulting contractual language informs
any unsophisticated parties or clarifies contract terms at the time
of adjudication. Rather, these clause-forcing default rules may
simply give sophisticated parties a good reason to state expressly
that they wish to exclude legal enforcement to the greatest extent
permissible. Lawmakers then must establish additional mandatory
rules to determine precisely how far drafting parties may go in
opting for norms rather than law.
E. Some Potential Policy Implications
Lawmakers currently assume uncritically that unsophisticated
parties read and understand formal contract provisions. The avail-
able evidence, however, suggests that parties most often ignore such
provisions entirely.233 If the legal-information-forcing argument, on
which courts often rely, lacks a sound empirical foundation, then
perhaps these rules serve some other purpose. My goal in this Part
has been to explore plausible alternatives and analyze whether
clause-forcing defaults might play a more empirically defensible
role. The discussion above has considered in a very preliminary way
several candidate justifications for clause-forcing rules.
Before we examine how those alternative justifications might
inform future doctrinal development, it is important to briefly
reconsider a strategy that could potentially salvage the conventional
legal-information-forcing rationale. Courts might try to reshape
contract doctrine in an effort to make these legal-information-
forcing rules dispel legal ignorance more effectively. Case law has
thus far sought principally to promote greater prominence and
clarity of express contract terms.234 Courts appear to believe that
232. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 149; Johnston, supra note 149.
233. See supra note 19.
234. Id.
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clearly drafted and typographically prominent terms are more
informative.235 Further study could reveal whether these or some
other doctrinal innovations hold the greatest promise for better
informing unsophisticated parties.
Currently, however, there is no empirical basis for determining
what techniques will work. Contemporary scholars such as Cass
Sunstein somewhat blithely assume that a combination of express
terms and disclosures will convey the targeted information.236
Similarly, Cynthia Estlund proposes that a “strong default” of just
cause will remedy workers’ ignorance about their at-will status.237
However, introspection and the available empirical evidence suggest
that most of these clauses and the closely analogous mandated
disclosures go unread.238 Legal ignorance thus persists despite the
widespread availability of detailed legal information about the
terms governing these transactions.
If the problem is that no one reads contracts, then a truly
effective doctrine to combat legal ignorance may need to require
parties to read their agreements before signing. Sophisticated
parties could be permitted to enforce exculpatory terms only after
quizzing their comparatively unsophisticated contractual partners
about the content and effect of those provisions.239 If, however, lay
people remain unable to understand these agreements even after
being compelled to read them, then perhaps courts would require an
attorney to be present when contracts are formed. The enormous
costs associated with these approaches should make us extremely
cautious to embrace them. If, for example, efficiency only requires
that reviewers, consumer advocates, and avid comparison shoppers
read written agreements,240 then it would be quite wasteful to
impose costly duties that apply to every transaction. However, if our
social goal is to ensure that each individual knows and understands
the meaning of each contract she enters, then lawmakers must
235. Id.
236. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, supra note 22, at 110.
237. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees, supra note 20, at 23-27. But see Estlund, Just the
Facts, supra note 20 (proposing a mandatory disclosure regime for employment).
238. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 3, at 671-72; Willis, supra note 6.
239. Both Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 175, and Boardman, supra note 184, propose
somewhat-less-rigorous versions of this process.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 202-03.
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develop some firm empirical basis for believing that particular forms
of regulation will be cost effective.
Alternatively, courts could abandon the pretense that formal
terms inform unsophisticated parties at all. Perhaps consumers and
workers are rationally ignorant about express contract terms.241 The
cost of reading and understanding contractual terms may far exceed
the expected value of being better informed about prevailing law.242
Parties thus may prefer to rely on informal norm-based mechanisms
of contract enforcement. If so, then efforts to force these parties to
become aware of the terms governing each transaction are socially
wasteful.
Courts might nevertheless encourage sophisticated parties to
draft express terms when that practice makes sense for other reas-
ons. For example, comprehensive express terms could make contract
terms clear ex post and thus reduce the costs of dispute resolu-
tion.243 However, embracing such an objective implies that courts
should reorder their regulatory priorities. Requirements of typo-
graphical prominence in no way promote the goal of ex post legal
clarity; nor would that objective provide any reason to impose
onerous requirements on the process of contract formation. Instead,
courts could focus almost exclusively on requiring drafting parties
to eliminate any possible ambiguity from the terms themselves
without worrying unduly about how those terms became part of the
contract.
Alternatively, exculpatory clauses may serve solely as a signal
that drafting parties wish to elect a norm-governed relationship. If
so, then lawmakers need to confront this fact and develop defensible
rules to police the boundary between law and norms. They must
decide when drafting parties may opt for norm-based enforcement,
and when courts should instead refuse to enforce exculpatory
clauses. These limits could protect individuals from mistakenly
accepting inefficient contract terms. Or courts might impose
constraints to vindicate other compelling public policies. As we have
seen, scholars differ sharply about the economic utility and social
241. See supra text accompanying notes 172-73.
242. See Verkerke, supra note 173. Those arguments were further articulated by Rudy,
supra note 171, at 340-41.
243. See supra Part III.C.
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consequences of exculpatory contractual boilerplate.244 It is well
beyond the scope of this Article to resolve that academic debate.
Nevertheless, my analysis shows the close connection between
clause-forcing rules and exculpatory boilerplate. Existing default
rules encourage sophisticated parties to incorporate express contract
language opting out of those defaults.
Of course, if no persuasive argument exists to justify default rules
that encourage express opt-outs, then courts should perhaps con-
sider abandoning clause-forcing rules entirely. Doing so, however,
would require courts to select an alternative default rule. Lawmak-
ers can easily remedy useless mandatory disclosure rules by the
simple expedient of eliminating the dysfunctional legal requirement.
In contrast, an unwanted clause-forcing rule must be replaced with
something else. A conventional majoritarian default rule would
almost certainly replicate the exculpatory boilerplate that the
clause-forcing default currently inspires. Sophisticated drafting
parties would probably opt out of any alternative default rule that
deviated significantly from the current contractual pattern. 
One final possibility is that courts have adopted clause-forcing
rules for reasons that they are simply unwilling to express. For
example, it may be difficult for a court to acknowledge that most
people derive no benefit from knowing the express terms of their
agreements. Or judges may balk at the prospect of adopting a
majoritarian default rule that so clearly favors the more sophisti-
cated and powerful party to a contract. Or the legal fiction that
express terms are truly informative may be easier to reconcile with
the judicial role than the reality that most sophisticated drafting
parties display pervasive antipathy to legal enforcement. On this
account, the true explanation for clause-forcing rules may combine
several of the alternative rationales I have explored in this Part.
Nevertheless, we can expect lawmakers to continue to talk about
clause-forcing rules as if express terms provide valuable legal
information.
244. See supra Part II.B.2.
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CONCLUSION
This Article argues that surprisingly many contract default rules
have the ostensible purpose of inducing sophisticated parties to
draft express contract language that will inform their contractual
partners about the legal rules governing a particular transaction. It
also suggests that this legal-information-forcing objective often
founders because people sign contracts without reading or under-
standing their terms. It is theoretically possible that courts could
design legal-information-forcing rules that would be truly informa-
tive, but we lack sufficient empirical data about how people process
legal information to be able to fashion such rules with any confi-
dence.
Recognizing the potential futility of attempts to inform most
contracting parties about complex legal rules, this Article explores
several alternative justifications for doctrines that encourage
sophisticated parties to draft express contract terms. Although
these clause-forcing rules are unlikely to “nudge” parties towards
better terms, the resulting express contract language may lower
information costs ex ante and thus facilitate the activities of avid
comparison shoppers, product reviewers, and consumer advocates.
Comprehensive written terms could also promote ex post legal
clarity and thereby reduce the costs of resolving disputes. Finally,
a litany of exculpatory clauses allows parties to contract out of the
comparatively expensive legal system of dispute resolution in favor
of a regime governed by informal social norms. On this account,
clause-forcing rules encourage sophisticated drafting parties to
signal their preference for a norm-governed relationship, and law-
makers then demarcate the boundary between law and norms by
deciding whether to enforce exculpatory clauses.
Each of these reasons for adopting rules that encourage parties
to draft exculpatory express contract terms sidesteps problems that
afflict the conventional legal-information-forcing argument. To the
extent that any of these stories justify using clause-forcing rules,
however, lawmakers should reorient related doctrines to serve their
goals more effectively. I have offered a very preliminary account of
how existing law might be reformulated. But further theoretical and
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empirical work will be needed to develop any definitive prescription
for reform. In the meantime, my analysis of these alternative
justifications shows the conceptual poverty of accounts that presume
express contract terms inform the majority of unsophisticated
parties. Any successful defense of the existing legal regime must
necessarily venture beyond the conventional understanding of legal-
information-forcing rules.
